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This Article uses two current movement governance proposalscommunity control of the police and community control of local
economic development-to develop a broader, transsubstantive
frameworkfor analyzing how local governance institutions might shift
power and attempt to redress inequality. We identify three key
dimensionsalong which to analyze thepotentialforpower-shifingand
contestation in local governance: the nature of authority, the
composition of the governing body, and the moment of authority.
Community control may or may not be part of the answer to
longstandingstructural inequality. But it is still worth exploring the
dynamics of local governance that can (or cannot) facilitate
contestation, build power, and push back on the antidemocratic
structures of law themselves. This Article begins to take on that task.
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INTRODUCTION

In June 2018, the Partnership for Working Families, a coalition of
grassroots community organizations, launched a multicity campaign challenging
urban inequality. The "We Make This City" campaign emphasizes the
importance of community control through the direct democratic governance of
the city's "infrastructure," including parks, housing, and transit systems. 1
Meanwhile, the Movement for Black Lives, the racial justice collective
reshaping advocacy around criminal law and policing, 2 has called for "[d]irect
democratic community control of local, state, and federal law enforcement
agencies," with a transfer of power to "communities most harmed by destructive
policing."3 Both of these calls for community control are part of a larger struggle
in which grassroots groups working for racial and economic justice in the United
States have sought to transform the relationship between the state and
marginalized groups-especially poor people of color-by designing
institutionalized forms of engaging in contestation and exercising countervailing
power.
The calls of social movements for community control are particularly loud
in the areas of policing and local economic development. Take policing: from
Chicago to Oakland to Houston to Nashville, local grassroots groups have
pushed for civilian commissions that transfer power from the police to the
communities most affected by mass incarceration. 4 These institutions of
community control would then have the ability to set policies, discipline officers,
and control police budgets.5 Although "civilian review" of policing has for
decades been a mainstay in national police reform efforts,6 the current push for

1. The Problem & Solution, P'SHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, WE MAKE THIS CITY,
http://wemakethiscity.org/the-problem-solution [https://perma.cc/88NX-WSBY]; see also P'SHIP FOR
WORKING FAMILIES, WE MAKE THIS CITY: CAMPAIGN LAUNCH TOOLKIT (2018) (on file with authors)
(emphasizing same campaign focal points).
2. For a history of the formation of the Movement for Black Lives and the other organizations
that make up the Black Lives Matter Movement, see BARBARA RANSBY, MAKING ALL BLACK LIVES
MATTER 1-10 (2018).
3.
Community Control, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/communitycontrol [https://perma.cc/6VA8-MRSN].
4. See generally Ted Alcom, Who Will Hold the Police Accountable?, ATLANTIC (July 25,
44 4
8 /
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/07/battle-over-police-accountability/59
[https://perma.cc/85BP-Z2V7] (discussing local efforts to hold police accountable in various U.S.

cities).
5.

See generallyM Adams & Max Rameau, Black Community Control over Police,2016 WIS.

L. REV. 515, 530-38 (laying out the current arguments for community control over the police); Larry
Redmond, Why We Need Community Control of the Police, 21 LOY. PUB. INT. L. REP. 226 (2015)
(detailing the push for community control of the police in Chicago, New Orleans, Detroit, Berkeley, and
Minneapolis); Community Control, supranote 3.
6. See generally SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN
OVERSIGHT (2001) (documenting the history of civilian oversight and civilian review in the United
States); JOSEPH DE ANGELIS ET AL., OJP DAGNOSTIC CTR. & NAT'L AsS'N FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT
(2016),
ENFORCEMENT
OF
LAW
OVERSIGHT
CIVILIAN
LAW
ENF'T,
OF
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community control over policing has a more direct focus on shifting power over
7
policing policies down to the people most affected by everyday policing.
Grassroots organizations are similarly seeking control over local governance in
the area of local development. In places like Oakland, Detroit, and New York,
movement actors are running neighborhood planning meetings to offer a
homegrown alternative to major urban redevelopment plans developed by city
officials. With pressure from these groups, some of these cities have created new
commissions comprised of community members themselves, with the power to
oversee and monitor major development projects. 8 As with policing, these
activists are increasingly searching for ways to create tangible methods of control
over local governance, rather than seeking only influence or input.
This Article uses these two examples of current pushes for community
control over policing and economic development to develop a transsubstantive
framework 9 for analyzing institutions of local governance aimed at shifting
power and redressing inequality. With their pushes for community control, social
movement actors aim to accomplish two transformative goals: first, contesting
deep structural inequalities of race and class; and second, building and
institutionalizing more direct forms of control over local governance. The degree
to which such new governance arrangements actually shift power downwards
turns a great deal on institutional design questions. Imagine local officials
propose building a new institution of local governance---one which claims to
allow "communities" to "participate" in an important city function or servicewith the explicit goal of countering systemic inequalities. Imagine further that
this new institution decenters decision-making to a neighborhood or district
within a larger locality. 10 This new institution likely (or hopefully) provides
some form of community representation on a decision-making body and, in
doing so, shifts some share of formal authority to traditionally powerless
constituencies. On the surface, this looks like a radical, democratizing
transformation that empowers local residents. But whether real power-shifting is
taking place depends on a number of factors. The distinction between
https://d3n8a8pro7vhnix.cloudfront.net/nacole/pages/161/attachments/original/1481727977/NACOLE
-short doc FINAL.pdf71481727977
[https://perma-cc/TB4M-ZQZY]
(reviewing models of
contemporary civilian oversight of the police).
7. Cf Adams & Rameau, supranote 5, at 538 ("To be perfectly clear, this is not a call for some
type of civilian investigative, oversight, or review board. With full control over the police, civilian
review is redundant and unnecessary.").
8. See K. Sabeel Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 315,
345-51 (2018) [hereinafter Rahman, Policymaking].
9. See generallyDavid Marcus, Trans-Substantivityand the ProcessesofAmerican Law, 2013
BYU L. REv. 1191, 1191 (defining transsubstantive as "doctrine that, in form and manner of application,
does not vary from one substantive context to the next").
10. See Richard Briffault, The Rise ofSublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L.
REv. 503, 509-21, 531-32 (1997) (defining structures of sublocal governance); Nadav Shoked, The
New Local, 100 VA. L. REv. 1323, 1327-29 (2014) (identifying the burgeoning of "new local" legal
institutions at the sublocal level).

2020]

THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF COMMUNITY CONTROL

683

democratizing reforms and mere window dressing turns in large part on the
specifics of institutional design.
In this Article, we place this analysis of governance solutions and their
design at the forefront. We approach this task not by proposing ideal forms of
governance from first principles, but rather by looking to the efforts of social
movement actors on the ground as they continually reimagine and redesign local
institutional arrangements. Drawing on each of our own works studying bottomup resistance in criminal legal institutions 11 and the democratization of economic
governance,12 we focus on renewed calls for community control within two
distinct areas of law and localized political debate: policing and urban
development. By looking to current campaigns for institutional reform for
insight, this Article excavates specific tools and approaches that scholars can and
should incorporate into discussions of how to not simply address, but rather to
redress, the complex interactions between law, power, structure, and inequality.
We identify three key dimensions along which to analyze the potential for
power-shifting and contestation in local governance: the nature of authority, the
composition of the governing body, and the moment of authority. The first of
these dimensions is the nature of authority, a level of analysis that zeroes in on
the extent to which a local governance institution possesses power over, or
merely input into, its domain of authority. This level of analysis also assesses
whether that power of authority governs an area of governance with connections
to deep structural drivers of inequality or distribution. The second dimension, the
composition of the governing body, looks directly at whether there are
safeguards in place to ensure that traditionally powerless populations are
represented on the governing body and whether those participants are truly
independent, thus facilitating forms of contestation from below that might
otherwise be silenced. And the third dimension, the moment of authority, asks
whether the governing body's decision-making occurs upstream, affecting the
wider distribution of resources or services, or downstream, focusing on a more
restricted or incremental range of decisions. Taken together, these three
dimensions provide a way to conceptualize power-building with reference to
specific institutional mechanisms and strategies, and they lay bare instances in
which local institutions that claim to encourage participation from below may in
fact foreclose real contestation and structural change.
11. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REv. 391 (2016); Jocelyn
Simonson, Democratizing CriminalJustice through Contestation andResistance, 111 Nw. U. L. REV.
1609 (2017) [hereinafter Simonson, Democratizing CriminalJustice];Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal
CourtAudience in a Post-trial World, 127 HARv. L. REv. 2173 (2014); Jocelyn Simonson, The Place
of "the People" in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUIM. L. REv. 249 (2019) [hereinafter Simonson, The
Place of "the People']; see also Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (in a parallel work, analyzing power-shifting in governance in police reform).
12. See, e.g., IC SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION (2017) [hereinafter
RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION]; K Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private
Power,Social Infrastructure,and the Revival ofthe Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621
(2018); Rahman, Policymaking,supra note 8.
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Our examples of policing and economic development are not meant to be
definitive case studies, but rather intended to illustrate broader themes of power,
contestation, and bottom-up democratic control animating the efforts of
movement activists. One important (though not the only) implication of our
analysis is that building genuine power may require more than conventional
processes of civic engagement exemplified by the reigning ideals of community
policing and civic engagement in urban planning decisions. It may require
instead a power-oriented view of participation that focuses on the ability of
historically disempowered groups to engage in forms of contestation that move
beyond oppositional politics to institutionalize power. We have each argued in
the past that certain realms of law are constitutive of citizenship and democracy
as much as they are informed by them. 13 We do not defend those claims in detail
in this Article. Instead, we look forward toward potential antidotes to the
antidemocratic nature of many systems of law and governance, honing in on
ways structures of governance can (or cannot) build power and push back on the
antidemocratic structures of law themselves.
Questions of democratic institutional design are, of course, a central matter
of concern for public law, including questions of balancing factional power,
preventing interest group capture, and assuring responsive and accountable
forms of governance. 14 But viewing these institutional design questions from the
vantage point of on-the-ground social movements complements these familiar
literatures in several key ways. First, it is interesting to see how grassroots actors
and policy-makers alike develop institutional designs and innovations
organically in real time--often without direct engagement with legal expertise,
yet formulating institutions that capture and deepen many of the familiar insights
of legal institutional design debates. We will have more to say about the potential
13.

See, e.g., RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION, supra note 12, at 139-65

(explaining how democratic agency can inform the regulatory process); Simonson, Democratizing
CriminalJustice,supranote 11, at 1610-12 (arguing that the criminal legal system is antidemocratic at
multiple levels).
14. The literature here is voluminous. See generally STEPHEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND
PUBLIC INTERESTS (2008) (describing institutional design and democracy challenges in the
administrative state); PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds.,
2014) (outlining novel approaches to ensuring democratic accountability and preventing interest-group
capture in bureaucratic governance); ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY:
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL (2007) (summarizing how institutional design choices advance

various democratic goals); Christopher R Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, Agency Design and Political
Control, 126 YALE L.J. 1002 (2017) (examining structural features of the institutional design of
agencies); Archon Fung, Survey Article: RecipesforPublic Spheres: EightInstitutionalDesignChoices
and Their Consequences, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 338 (2003) (describing design principles for participatory
governance mechanisms); Jacob E. Gersen, DesigningAgencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010) (synthesizing
literatures on the design choices that should inform regulatory institutional structure); Michael D.
Gilbert, Entrenchment, Incrementalism, and Constitutional Collapse, 103 VA. L. REV. 631 (2017)
(describing mechanisms for entrenching balance of political power in constitutional design to improve
rule of law and stability).

2020]

THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF COMMUNITY CONTROL

685

of greater interaction between legal scholarship and movements in Part IV
below. Second, these real-time policy fights represent attempts to balance the
need to transform structural power relations on the one hand, and to do so in
ways that are concrete, discrete, and connected to on-the-ground realities on the
other. And so, there is something distinctive about power-shifting institutional
designs arising from the bottom up and at the local level, rather than through the
more rarefied debates about constitutional structure.
Our analytic framework does not offer any magic bullets. We do not, in this
Article at least, claim that these tools and methods are necessarily the best or
most productive approaches to local governance, or to governance on any level.
Nor do we intend to stake a ground firmly within the scholarly debate over the
merits of localism with respect to state or federal governance.15 Policing, for6
example, has been notoriously resistant to change via community oversight,'
and has at times proven amenable to both state and federal oversight. 7 Our
claim, instead, is that we should not be too quick to abandon the promise of
"community control": facilitating communal contestation over drivers of
structural inequality through the design of local institutions. To return to the
example of policing, it is often easy to dismiss the idea of community oversight8
by pointing to the historical failure of civilian review of police departments.'
However, to lump the concept of community oversight into one limited historical
trajectory is to miss out on the variety of dimensions along which community
oversight of policing can operate. It also ignores the ways in which oversight
institutions with varying designs have historically ceded, or more frequently not
ceded, real power over structure to policed populations.1 9 In policing, in local
economic development, and in any number of policy areas, social movement
visions of institutional design can help demonstrate the range of governance
options-the roads not taken-that are worth taking seriously in any effort to
combat structural inequality.

15. See generallyNestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma ofLocalism in an Era ofPolarization,128
YALE L.J. 954, 963-84 (2019) (laying out the current state of that debate).
16. See generallyWALKER, supra note 6, at 44-45 (expressing ambivalence over the success of
civilian oversight of policing); Udi Ofer, GettingIt Right: Building Effective Civilian Review Boards to
Oversee Police, 46 SETON HALL L. REv. 1033, 1034 (2016) ("ITnhere is a growing feeling that these
[civilian oversight] institutions have too often failed when it comes to overseeing police departments.").
17. See Rachel A. Harmon, FederalProgramsand the Real Costs of Policing,90 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 870 (2015); Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, State Attorneys General as Agents of Police
Reform, 69 DUKE L.J. 999 (2020); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police
Departments,99 MINN. L. REv. 1343 (2015).
18. See WALKER, supranote 6, at 44-45.
19.

Cf DAvID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 114-20 (2008) (arguing that

reigning ideas about, and approaches to, democratic policing as "community policing" are limited in
their ability to combat inequality, and mask other ways of thinking about democracy and policing);
Simonson, Copwatching, supra note 11, at 400-05 (arguing that community policing reinscribes
existing power imbalances more than it shifts them).
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That the social movement visions of governance we study are taking place
largely at the local level is nevertheless significant. Policing and economic
development are two quintessentially "local" matters of public policy. 20 They
also manifest deeper, systemic concerns regarding the spatial nature of structural
racism and economic inequality. 21 The institutions of local governance, being
more plastic and porous, seem to offer movement actors more opportunities than
do national politics for potentially transformative institutional change. 22 Indeed,
as cities and states have become the focal point for progressive politics in the age
of President Donald Trump, the resources of social movements are increasingly
targeted at shifting the levers of power in local governance. 2 3 While in some
sense these interventions might seem small scale and modest, there is another
way in which they represent bold proof-of-concept campaigns and stepping
24
stones toward more transformational change that can be scaled up in the future.
At the same time, social movement actors recognize that localities have
historically been central to the construction of systemic racial and economic

20.

See RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE

253

(2016) (describing "security, education, transportation, health, and shelter" as the "basic and obvious"
central urban goods); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 58, 80-85 (1998) (observing
that policing is a typical city service and analyzing the relationship between crime prevention and
economic development); Harmon, supra note 17, at 877 ("Localism may be American policing's most
distinctive characteristic ...- (citing William J. Stuntz, Terrorism,Federalism,andPoliceMisconduct,
25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 665, 665 (2002))).
21. See generally David Dante Troutt, Trapped in Tragedies: Childhood Trauma Spatial
Inequality,andLaw, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 601,603 (2018) (describing the role ofplace-based differences
in the creation and perpetuation of structural inequality); see also infra Part ll.B.
22. See Nestor M. Davidson, LocalistAdministrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 625-27 (2017)
(analyzing local bureaucracies as potential sites of democratic engagement, as well as exclusion);
Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-Foreword:FederalismAll the Way Down, 124
HARV. L. REV. 4, 7-8, 24-25 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, FederalismAll the Way Down] (describing
the benefits of allowing minorities to exercise a "muscular form of voice" within institutions at the
sublocal level); Richard C. Schragger, The PoliticalEconomy of City Power,44 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
91, 130-32 (2017) (arguing that city power and local political participation have the potential to counter
economic inequality caused by market capitalism).
23.

See, e.g., ROXANA TYNAN ET AL., L.A. ALLIANCE FOR NEW ECON. ET AL., UNMASKING

THE
HIDDEN
POWER
OF
CITIES
2,
7-18
(2018),
https:/laane.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/Unmasking-the-Hidden-Power-of-Cities.pdf [https://permacc/G9YF-QZ82]
(identifying "the seven core legal powers of local governments to identify the potential scale of impact"
on progressive policy-making). This turn to the local has been a focal point for social justice movements
even before the Trump Administration. See, e.g., MANUEL PASTOR, JR. ET AL., THIS COULD BE THE
START OF SOMETHING BIG: How SOCIAL MOVEMENTS FOR REGIONAL EQUITY ARE RESHAPING

METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2009) (describing the modem turn by progressive social movements to
focus on urban and regional politics as a way to pioneer inclusive public policy); SCIRAGGER, supra
note 20, at 165 (describing the potentially expansive power cities have to address issues of economic
inequality, racial discrimination, and more in the modem context).
24. On the "right to the city" and urban political movements, see Richard Schragger, Is a
Progressive City Possible? Reviving Urban Liberalismfor the Twenty-First Century, 7 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 231,237-42 (2013).
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inequality. 25 There are, therefore, dangers in relying on localism as a panacea
without also examining whether new or reformed local institutions are truly
addressing historical inequalities along axes of power and structure.2 6 Even the
word "community" is itself fraught, carrying with it associative dangers of
vagueness and co-optation. 27 But we use the movement term of "community
control" throughout this Article because it is itself a way through which
movement actors are reclaiming and redefining what they see as a more
inclusionary view of what community should be. By putting forth new local
institutional designs and making a claim on the definition of "community," social
movements are engaging in real time with longstanding debates over the benefits
and drawbacks of local governance solutions to structural inequality.
Our analysis is indebted to legal scholars who have paved the way for us,
including Heather K. Gerken's pioneering theorizing of issues of power and
composition in local decision-making bodies28 and the approach of democratic
experimentalism, in which scholars have looked to the reform of institutional
practices as a way of revisiting dominant ideas of how legal change happens,

25. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part l-Localism andLegal Theory, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 346,453 (1990) ("[A]n absolute commitment to local autonomy is not a basis for a progressive
social transformation but rather can be an obstacle to efforts to reduce inequality and ameliorate class
and race antagonisms."); Daniel Farbman, ReconstructingLocal Government, 70 VAND. L. REV. 413,
450-64 (2017) (describing how local government structures mirrored, and at times exacerbated, racial
anxiety during Reconstruction); Richard Thompson Ford, The BoundariesofRace: PoliticalGeography
in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1844 (1994) (describing the "oppressive and
disempowering" nature of boundary-drawing in local government).
26. See Briffault, supra note 10, at 508-09 (analyzing the drawbacks of sublocal structures,
which may "tend to enhance the place of private interests in urban governance"); Sheryll D. Cashin,
Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New
Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1987-90 (2000) (describing how localism and the fragmentation of
governance can place more resources in the hands of the already-privileged and exclude marginalized
populations, especially poor people of color); Davidson, supra note 15, at 958 ("[A]s much as local
governments can advance economic fairness, social justice, and policy innovation, they can - and often
do -use their power as a tool of exclusion, reinforcing racial and socioeconomic inequality."); Farbman,
supra note 25, at 495 ("One person's local control is another person's tyranny."); Shoked, supra note
10, at 1380 ("Micro-localism can only engage residents in participatory politics if real political powers,
pertaining to issues that 'matter,' are delegated to them.").
27. Cf LAURA I APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 70-91 (2015) (discussing the difficulties with defiming community in relation to criminal
justice); Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justiceand the Danger of "Community, " 2003 UTAH L. REV.
343, 349-64 (critiquing the idea of community in the context of the restorative justice and "community
justice" movements).
28. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2005)
[hereinafter Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding] (considering how dissenting minorities potentially
influence state decision-making); Heather K Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1099, 1164 (2005) [hereinafter Gerken, Second-Order Diversity] (discussing how minority groups
"have a chance to exercise control in making democratic judgments" at the intralocal level).
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especially at the local level. 29 And we are inspired by efforts both old3" and new3 1
to use the visions and practices of social movement actors at "the bottom"3 2 as a
source of inspiration, example, and analysis. 33 Our approach builds off of these

theories and methodologies, opening up what we hope is a new way of
conceptualizing

the interaction between localized power, structure, and

governance. Our framework asks scholars to pay closer attention to the specific
levers of power over which historically disempowered groups seek control,
asking not just whether shifting power downward makes sense, but also how
34

those shifts can (or cannot) be institutionalized.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by laying out a
conception of contestatory participation in local governance, and connecting that
idea of contestation as power-building to broader goals of democracy and
equality. Part II turns to the contemporary movement landscape, exploring two
examples of social movement visions of "community control": policing and local
economic development. These two examples are indicative of the ways in which
social movements are imagining new institutional arrangements that shift
political power in an effort to combat structural inequality. Part Inl then builds
on these examples to present a set of conceptual tools for theorizing power-

building in local institutional design. We present a taxonomy of three dimensions
of the relationship between structure and power that can facilitate a deeper
examination of the potential for building power and contesting structure in deep

29. See Richard Briffault, "What About the Ism '?"Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (1994); Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Democratic Experimentalism, in SEARCHING FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL
THOUGHT 477 (Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2017).
30. See, e.g., Mar J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 325 (1987) (suggesting that legal scholars could study "the actual
experience, history, culture, and intellectual tradition of people of color in America" to create critical
legal theories from the bottom, rather than from the top, of power).
31. See, e.g., STONES OF HOPE: How AFRICAN ACTIVISTS RECLAIM HUMAN RIGHTS TO
CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY (Lucie E. White & Jeremy Perelman eds., 2011) [hereinafter STONES
OF HOPE]; Amna A. Akbar, Toward a RadicalImagination ofLaw, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405,473 (2018)
("[S]ocial movement imaginations... invest us in a creative, imaginative project sorely missing from
law scholarship."); Sameer M. Ashar, Movement Lawyers in the Fightfor ImmigrantRights, 64 UCLA
L. Rev. 1464, 1468 (2017) ("In this particular moment in American political culture, the propagation of
accounts of activists and lawyers engaged in creative social justice campaigns is a worthy end in and of
itself.").
32. Matsuda, supra note 30, at 324 ("Looking to the bottom-adopting the perspective of those
who have seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise-can assist critical scholars in the task of
fathoming the phenomenology of law and defining the elements ofjustice.").
33. Cf Scott L. Cummings, The Puzzle of Social Movements in American Legal Theory, 64
UCLA L. Rev. 1554 (2017) (arguing that one function of studying the interaction between law and social
movements is to facilitate an analysis of the complex relationship between law and democracy).
34. Cf Davidson, supranote 22, at 626 (arguing for the importance in local government law
scholarship of returning to "basic questions of community, participation, and exclusion"); Daryl J.
Levinson, The Supreme Court,2015 Term-Foreword:Looking for Power in PublicLaw, 130 HARV.
L. REV. 31, 112-42 (2016) (calling for legal scholars to pay closer attention to the mechanisms of power
and power-shifting in institutions of public law).
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and enduring ways. These dimensions emerge from the examples explored in
Part II, and resonate with previous scholarly explorations of democratic and
participatory governance. In Part IV, we explore our approach's implications for
current debates in policy reform and legal scholarship, particularly regarding the
revived interest in power and institutional design in public law, the new
literatures on cities and local government law, research on law and social
movements, and the burgeoning focus on local strategies for change in both
criminal law and economic development scholarship. We conclude by
suggesting that scholarly and political hesitancy around community control may
be rooted less in the supposed inability of communities to exercise effective
control over complex structural dynamics, and more in an elite suspicion of, and
hesitancy with, bottom-up democracy itself-what we term a problem of
"demophobia."
I.
POWER, STRUCTURE, AND DEMOCRATIC CONTESTATION

In this Part, we briefly present a set of interlocking ideas about democracy,
contestation, structure, and power inspired by both scholarly conversations and
social movement strategies. We center the relationship between communal
contestation and structural inequality, setting the stage for the study in Parts II
and III of current efforts of social movement actors to institutionalize local
power.
A.

ConceptualizingDemocraticContestation

What is contestation, and how does it build power? We begin in this Part
by focusing in on a conception of democratic participation that prioritizes
contestation over consensus, with special attention to power imbalances among
different populations within a polity. 35 In this approach to democratization, the
goal of democratic institutions is not necessarily to forge consensus or
agreement. Rather, our emphasis is on institutional structures that catalyze and
facilitate greater contestation of governmental decisions, particularly by
disempowered or marginalized constituencies. We start from the premise that in
the lived reality of modem-day democracy, some constituencies already possess

There are vast scholarly literatures recounting efforts to improve civic engagement,
35.
grassroots participation, and collaboration between communities on the one hand, and policy-makers on
the other. Although the literature is too vast to be summarized here, for a good overview of these debates,
see generally JAMES S. FISHK1N, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC

CONSULTATION (2009) (summarizing the developments in deliberative democracy theory and realworld examples of deliberative and participatory governance in action); BETH SIMONE NOVECK, SMART
CITIZENS, SMARTER STATE 4-7 (2015) (describing the rise of the "Civic Science" movement and efforts
to improve participation and civic engagement in government policy-making); Sherry R_ Arnstein, A
Ladder of Citizen Participation,35 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 216 (1969); Archon Fung, Varieties of
Participationin Complex Governance, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 66 (2006).
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greater capacity for power and influence. The task of democratizing reform then
is to better enable countervailing interests and community groups to assert their
views, to hold governments and other actors to account, and to claim a share of
governing power. As a variety of democratic theorists have argued, such
contestation is essential to holding government and economic elites
accountable. 36 More than that, it is necessary to shift and build countervailing
political power in a world characterized by profound inequality.
By focusing on inequality, our account of the benefits of collective
contestation differs somewhat from leading accounts. 37 By contestation, we
generally mean any form of political action that involves direct opposition to
reigning laws, policies, or state practices. But we also mean to focus in on
contestation from populations and communities that have historically had a
reduced voice in generating reigning ideas about how to govern and how to
distribute state resources, including local services such as policing and housing.
This account of contestation comes close to what Chantal Mouffe terms agonistic
politics, in that it involves political opposition to hegemonic ideas that uphold
dominant and oppressive political structures. 38 Moreover, as in Mouffe's account
of agonism, the action happens in an adversarial manner but within the bounds
of current political structures. 39 But by using the word contestation, we also

mean to invoke the broader idea that building countervailing political power is
itself a goal of legal and political change; when relatively powerless people or
groups engage in contestatory practices, it can lead to the building of political
agency and the remedying of power imbalances.4 ° This account is spelled out in
more detail in our past work, in which we have both focused on a view of

36. See, e.g., CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS 1-18 (2013) (arguing that contestation is
necessary to overcome dominant, elite hegemonic ideas and social arrangements); PHILIP PETrrIT,
REPUBLICAmSM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (David Miller & Alan Ryan eds., photo.
reprt. 2002) (1997) (articulating a modem theory of republicanism where political legitimacy and
freedom are premised on the ability of citizens to contest the actions of the state).
37. See, e.g., PETTnT, supranote 36.
38. MOUFFE, supranote 36, at 1-18; see also Simonson, Copwatching,supra note 11, at 43536 (using the lens of agonism to argue for the importance of respecting the practice of organized
copwatching by marginalized populations).
39. See MOUFFE, supra note 36, at 51 (identifying the preservation of democratic spaces as
necessary for agonism); Simonson, Copwatching,supra note 11, at 437 (describing how agonistic
contestation happens "through civic engagement with the processes in place").
40. The links between social movement mobilizations and longer-term power-building is a key
theme for social movement scholars. See, e.g., HARJtE HAN, How ORGANIZATIONS DEVELOP
ACTIVISTS (2014) (describing different organizational structures of social movements and advocacy
groups, and how they can build long-term power); K. SABEEL RAHMAN & HOLLIE RUsSON GILMAN,
CIVIC POWER (2019) (arguing that democratic contestation can build durable power and redress power
imbalances by establishing more effective civil society organizations and more participatory govemance

institutions).
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democracy that emphasizes not participation for its own sake, but rather
41
contestatory participation that shifts and builds countervailing political power.
This Article focuses on how collective contestation can potentially happen
within institutions of governance, in ways that give historically disempowered
populations power over the very levers of decision-making that control the
distribution of local resources. 42 To be sure, productive collective contestation
can happen in multiple forms, including bottom-up participation in everyday
adjudication, 43 large-scale litigation,' and communal forms of organization and
protest outside of formal state channels. 45 But local governance in particular has
the potential to generate political power over the institutions that are closest to
everyday decisions about the distribution of services and resources. Heather
Gerken has long explored how local decision-making by political minorities"dissenting by deciding"--can have the benefit of mixing real power-wielding
46
with contestation over broader political priorities and ideals. And, in a different
vein, the global municipalist movement has recently focused in on the potential
of movement control over institutions of local governance as a way to distribute
both power and resources. 47 One of our goals in this Article is to use the
governance designs put forth by political minorities themselves to explore
41. See, e.g., Simonson, Democratizing CriminalJustice,supra note 11; Simonson, The Place
of "the People, "supra note 11; RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION, supra note 12, at 105-

08.
42. Cf Levinson, supra note 34, at 83-92 (arguing for the importance of tracing power-shifting
through institutions).
43.

See, e.g., Simonson, The Place of "the People," supra note 11, at 287-90 (describing

communal forms of contestation in everyday criminal adjudication).
44.

See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REv. 941 (2011)

(describing how losing litigation may be beneficial for social movements); Sunita Patel, Toward
Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for "Community Engagement" Provisions in DOJ Consent

Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 793, 809-18 (2016) (suggesting that community participation in
consent decrees may help shift power when litigation outcomes fail to reform police-community
relations).
45. See, e.g., Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 57, 62-63 (2011) (describing forms of communal governance outside of the state); Lani Guinier
& Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudenceof Law and Social Movements,

123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2762-77 (2014) (describing how Fannie Lou Hamer and other activists with the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party engaged in collective contestation over the meaning of political
representation); Simonson, Copwatching,supranote 11, at 407-27 (focusing on collective contestation
from organized copwatching groups).
46. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 28, at 1777 (describing dissent of local
decision-making bodies as "both an act of affiliation and an act of contestation"); see also Gerken,
FederalismAll the Way Down, supranote 22, at 65 ("Dissenting by deciding... represents an intriguing
blend of loyalty and rebellion. It fuses an act of governance with an act of contestation.").
47.

See Berfie Russell, Fearless Cities Municipalism: Experiments in Autogestion, OPEN

DEMOCRACY (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/fearless-citiesmunicipalism-experiments-in-autogestion/ [https://perma.cc/86LZ-8J9D] (describing the use of local
governance to "transform[] the institution itself and its mechanisms in order to distribute power"
(citation omitted)); Christian Iaione & Elena De Nictolis, UrbanPooling, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 665,
686-87 (2017) (describing how social movements, especially in Europe, have "evolved from the early
resistance mode" toward building municipal platforms).
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institutional forms that can (or cannot) provide mechanisms of dissenting by
deciding-asking not just if those groups are doing the deciding, but also
exploring the relationship between those decisions and larger issues of structural
exclusion and group power.
When we speak of power in this article, we are thinking of direct political
power: the ability of a person, or a group of people in our case,4 8 to influence
policy outcomes and control the distribution of state resources. This is a strong
view of power; one that, to paraphrase Max Weber, requires that a group of
people be able to enact their policy despite resistance to it. 4 9 Power in this
reading requires the ability to make decisions that stick, 50 whether it is through
the power to enact policy, what Daryl Levinson calls "capacity," or the power to
check state actors, what Levinson calls "control. '5 1 Other forms of power existthe power to shape ideology 52 or the power to build political capacity through
organizing. 53 But our focus is on a strong version of political power, one that
allows us to highlight both current inequalities in political power, and the
difference between contestatory and consensus-based methods of political
participation. 54 It also allows us to differentiate our analysis from a more general
call for populism, for the creation of institutions that will raise up an exclusionary
ideal of "the people" in the name of us all. 55 To the contrary, a focus on
contestation as power-wielding demonstrates the multifaceted nature of "the
people" and the necessity of creating institutions that aim to equalize power
among the many different groups within a polity. 56
This conceptual approach to thinking about democracy and contestation in
governance is valuable in an era in which disparities in political power magnify
48. Cf Michael Grinthal, Power With: PracticeModels for SocialJusticeLawyering, 15 U. PA.
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 25, 36 (2011) ("We each have in our bodies the power to move stones, but if we
can coordinate our bodies with other bodies, we have the power to build cities. This, crudely, is why
power comes from organizing people.").
49. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 53 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Ephraim Fischoff et al. eds., 1968) ("Power... is the probability that one actor within a social
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance ... ").
50. STEVEN LUKES, POWER (2d ed. 2005) (distinguishing between decision-making and nondecision-making power).
51.
Levinson, supra note 34, at 46-48.
52. LUKES, supra note 50, at 7-8.
53.
Grinthal, supra note 48, at 34 (defining "organizing as the processes by which people build
and exercise power by collecting and activating relationships").
54. Cf CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 33-34 (photo. reprt. 2009) (2005)
("Instead of trying to erase the traces of power and exclusion, democratic politics requires us to bring
them to the fore, to make them visible so that they can enter the terrain of contestation.").
55.

See JAN-WERNER MOLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 3-4 (2016) (describing a core belief of

populism that only some of the people are truly "the people"). But see Jason Frank, Populism Isn't the
Problem, BOS. REV. (Aug. 15, 2018), http://bostonreview.net/politics/jason-fi-ank-populism-not-theproblem [https://perma.cc/454M-W4E3] (arguing that it is dangerous to equate authoritarianism with
populism).
56. Cf Simonson, The Place of "thePeople," supranote 11, at 287-90 (expanding on this idea
in the context of criminal adjudication).
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pervasive inequalities.57 It also points toward the need to reform democratic
institutions in ways that better balance political power. If power is made a central
concern, then the solution involves less focus on "substantive" policy answers,
and more on the institutional configurations that can alter the balance of who
governs. Indeed, as we describe in Part I.B, it is precisely because structural
forms of inequality are so vast and diffuse that they are so difficult to contest. In
order to counteract these structural forms of inequality, affected constituencies,
particularly those that are historically disempowered and underresourced, may
need to build institutions through which they can exercise power. For example,
recent debates about the future of worker organizing have noted the importance
of building durable civil society and state institutional structures through which
workers can effectively influence governance.5 8 And it is hard to imagine how
minority or poorer communities in a gentrifying city can win more favorable
policies without community organizing to build their influence-and without
city or even regional institutions through which they can affect the larger
processes of zoning, planning, and urban development.5 9 Institutional design is
60
therefore key to making such bottom-up contestation possible.
B. The View From Social Movements: Power Over Structure
These normative concepts of contestation and control find expression
among social movements seeking to radically democratize policy-making.
Grassroots groups working for racial and economic justice in the United States
have for decades sought to put forward methods of transforming the relationship
between the state and marginalized groups, especially poor people of color.
These social movements have long used a "structural" lens, where the causes of
inequality, racial disparities, and even violence cannot be reduced to the actions
of individual people or policies. Instead, a structural approach centers on the

57. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Separationsof Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and
Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419, 421 (2015) ("Rising inequality has been accompanied by the
concentration, or reconcentration, of political power among wealthy individuals .... "); Levinson, supra
note 34, at 134-40; Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional
Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, at 1467-71 (2016); cf Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring
PoliticalPower: Suspect Class Determinationsand the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 352-70 (2016)
(theorizing the relationship between povery and a political powerlessness).
58. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016); Brishen Rogers,
LibertarianCorporatismIs Not an Oxymoron, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1623 (2016); Benjamin I. Sachs, The
Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining,123 YALE L.J. 148 (2013); KATE ANDRIAS
& BRISHEN ROGERS, REBUILDING WORKER VOICE IN TODAY'S ECONOMY, ROOSEVELT INST. (Aug.

2018),
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Rebuilding-Worker-Voices-final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/T84M-9Y7V].
59. Cf Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Casefor Regionalism, 47 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 63, 68-69 (2013) (describing the importance of regional governance structures in an era
of interregional mobility).
See, e.g., JOHN P. MCCORMICK, MACIAVELLIAN DEMOCRACY (2011) (arguing for
60.
institutional designs to empower the people to hold business and political elites accountable).
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relations of power over time, on the interactions between seemingly disparate
policy areas, and on how ideologies that separate out class from race, or race
from gender, reify the inequalities around us. 6 1 For example, policies of racial
discrimination and exclusion in housing, zoning, and urban planning have
created shockingly persistent patterns of racial and economic segregation, and
intergenerationally depressed upward mobility and wages. 6 2 And in the realm of
criminal law, there is a toxic interaction between systems of mass incarceration,
63
state austerity, privatization, and continued racial subordination and exclusion.
This structural diagnosis of the problems of inequality and exclusion is important
for shaping movement visions of democratic control: if the problems are
control
structural in nature, then for democratic control to make a difference, that
64
must be designed in ways that can tackle pervasive structural forces.
The Movement for Black Lives (M4BL), a grassroots coalition of more
than fifty organizations from across the United States, exemplifies this structural
approach. 65 Although M4BL emerged as a response to police violence against
people of color, 66 its vision for change goes well beyond the idea of police
violence to look at transforming the overall relationship between the state and
the marginalized people who are most often the victims of police violence. In the
See Akbar, supra note 31, at 435-60; Gary L. Blasi, What's A Theory For?: Notes on
61.
Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMi L. REV. 1063, 1085-94 (1994); Scott L.
Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A CriticalReflection on Law and Organizing,48 UCLA L. REV. 443,
480-87 (2001) (exploring the challenges movements face in organizing around structural issues).
62.

See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF

How OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) [hereinafter ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF
LAW] (describing how the U.S. government enacted and enforced racially discriminatory policies in
housing and zoning throughout America); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013) (describing how
geographic patterns of birth and residency have intergenerational effects on wealth and mobility
especially for communities of color); Troutt, supra note 21.
63. See generallyRUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND
OPPOSITION INGLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007) (describing the political economy ofthe prison boom
in California); Akbar, supra note 31, at 421-60 (describing connections between American policing and
larger systems of racial and economic domination); Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling
ofLegal Estrangement,126 YALE L.J. 2054 (2017) (describing the structural conditions, including racial
isolation and class marginalization, that undergird the estrangement of poor people of color from the
police); Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalizationof Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CR]MINOLOGY 643 (2009)
(describing the interdependence of the criminal and welfare states); Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing
CriminalLaw as an Abolitionist Project, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1597 (2017) (describing the spiraling
interactions between democratic inequalities, the criminal legal system, and white supremacy).
64. Cf Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, The Dutyfor ResponsibleAdministrationand the
Problem ofPoliceAccountability, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 165,205 (2016) (considering race discrimination
in the juvenile justice system as an example supporting the idea that "[s]ometimes the most effective
way to vindicate civil rights values is to change an institution's core practices").
65. See About Us, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/CTG2-BTR3].
66. Id. For histories of this emergence, see also RANSBY, supra note 2, at 1-10 (describing the
founding organizations of the Black Lives Matter movement); KEEANGA-YAMAHTrA TAYLOR, FROM
#BLACKLIVESMATTER TO BLACK LIBERATION 153-91 (2016); Akbar, supra note 31, at 421-23
(describing the rise of the Movement for Black Lives).
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words of activists from Black Youth Project 100, an organization that is part of
M4BL: "America's economic system has systematically failed Black
communities for whole lifetimes with discriminatory policies; investment in
policing, surveillance, incarceration; and chronic underinvestment in our
livelihood. '' 67 As Amna Akbar has highlighted in recent work, this structural
vision of the problem with policing departs substantially from mainstream
accounts, in particular because M4BL brings with it deep critiques of the
68
interlocking set of systems of oppression that lead to police violence.
M4BL's broad diagnosis of the drivers of racial inequality led it to put forth
a set of sophisticated and far-reaching demands called the Vision for Black
Lives. 69 M4BL critiques standard reforms that merely tweak the current
landscape of policing, including community policing, putting forth instead a
vision of a criminal legal system transformed to serve the people it claims to
protect.7 0 Inspired by Black intellectual movements of the past, 71 these social
movement actors are seeking out "transformative" or "nonreformist" reforms
72
that shift power and wealth in concrete ways.
The strategies of M4BL member organizations are transsubstantive: they
cut across and link together multiple issue areas as codeterminants of a deeper
problem of historical inequalities and oppression. Consider, for example, the
"Invest/Divest" strategy of many M4BL member organizations. 73 Activist
groups in cities around the United States are demanding that local governments
reduce spending on policing and increase investment in poor communities in
other ways, for example through schooling, health care, infrastructure, and social
services. 74 The demand to Invest/Divest is deeply connected to a sense that,
67.
Our Impact, BLACK YOUTH PROJECT 100 (2019), https://byplOO.org/our-impact/
[https://perma.cc/DPA5-HGN8].
68. Akbar, supra note 31, at 411-15.
69. See Plafonrm, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/
[https://perma.cc/WSN6-QDTM].
70. See Mariame Kaba, Opinion, Police "Reforms" You Should Always Oppose, TRUTHOUT
(Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/27852-police-reforms-you-should-alwaysoppose [https://perma.cc/4FCV-TCSE]; cf Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way ItIs Supposed
To: The Limits of CriminalJustice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1425 (2016) ("The most far-reaching
racial subordination stems not from illegal police misconduct, but rather from legal police conduct.").
71.

See generally CHRISTOPHER J. LEBRON, THE MAKING OF BLACK LIVES MATTER (2017)

(describing the intellectual history of the Black Lives Matter movement); TAYLOR, supra note 66, at
153-91 (same).
72. Ruth Wilson Gilmore describes "nonrefornist reform" as "changes that, at the end of the
day, unravel rather than widen the net of social control through criminalization." GILMORE, supranote
63, at 242; see also ANDRE GORZ, STRATEGY FOR LABOR 6 (Martin A. Nicolaus and Victoria Ortiz
trans., 1967) (presenting a theory of "reforms which advance toward a radical transformation of

society'.
73.
THRIVE:

Eg., KATE HAMAJI ET AL., THE CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY ET AL., FREEDOM TO
1, 4 (2017),
SECURITY IN OUR COMMUNITIES
REIMAGINING SAFETY &

https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Freedom
[https://perma.cc/6R4Q-RUURI.
74. Id.

To Thrive%2C Higher Res Version.pdf
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historically, overpolicing and underinvestment in communities of color have
gone hand in hand. Under this view, the mass incarceration and prosecution of
poor people of color are inseparable from the ways in which the state abandoned
their neighborhoods by denying them basic education, housing, and other forms
of social support. 75 Nor can the issue be reduced to goverrnent spending on
people of color; instead it is wound up in deep study of how the state treats
76
women, children, queer people, immigrants, and other marginalized groups.
This structural view of the determinants of inequality and exclusion drives
a similarly transsubstantive economic policy agenda in movement circles. In
early 2016, for example, a coalition of racial and economic justice advocacy
groups-the Center for Community Change, the Center for Popular Democracy,
Jobs With Justice, the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, and
the Working Families Organization, each of which operates as a hub for dozens
of membership-based movement affiliates around the country-released a
comprehensive economic agenda entitled "Putting Families First.' 77 The report
linked together familiar economic policy issues, such as affordable housing and
the minimum wage, with a larger, explicit focus on the ways in which
longstanding policies and ideologies at the state and local level combine to create
durable, structural racial and economic inequality. 78 Thus, to address the
economic crisis in poor and minority communities, the agenda called for a
combined approach that integrated everything from housing and transportation
79
policy to criminal law reform to labor, poverty, and safety net reforms.
This movement focus on the interaction between structural inequality and
political power echoes a rich tradition in legal and public policy scholarship.
Scholars of economic and racial justice have long explored the importance of
understanding inequality and injustice in structural terms, from the construction

75.
For example, a recent report from a coalition of local organizations committed to racial
justice leads off this way: "The massive divestment from communities of color historically coincided
with the US government's 'War on Drugs' and 'tough on crime' policies, which are themselves some
of the newest linchpins in the nation's long history of social control and criminalization of marginalized
people." Id. at 3.
76. In the words of a movement leader in Detroit: "We cannot have this high police spending
while folks are being displaced, while children in the city do not have the same educational opportunities
as their suburban counterparts, while families go without water. Higher police budgets do not make us
safe." Id.at 36 (quoting Denzel McCampbell, Chapter Co-Chair, Black Youth Project 100 Detroit).
77.

DORIAN T. WARREN, COLUM. U. & ROOSEVELT INST., PUTTING FAMILIES FIRST: GOOD

JOBS
FOR
ALL
(2015),
[https://perma.cc/FV35-SSQ5].
78. Id
79.

https://scholars.org/sites/scholars/fles/families-first-report.pdf/

Id.; see also ANDREA FLYNN ET AL., REWRITE THE RACIAL RULES: BUILDING AN

INCLUSIVE AMERICAN ECONOMY, ROOSEVELT INST. (June 6, 2016), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Structural-Discrinination-Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AF7P-MYCB]
(developing a similarly broad structural focus integrating racial and economic policy dimensions at the
macro level).
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80
of intergenerational economic and racial inequality through city planning, to
81
the inequalities baked into the administration of welfare programs, to the
systemic disparities of political economy driving and created by the criminal
legal system.82 This structural approach shifts focus from questions of individual
mistreatment or blameworthiness to underlying systems of legal interpretation
and institutional design that create larger patterns of racial, gender, economic, or
other inequality. The scholarly attention to structure is evident both in classical
83
traditions of critical legal scholarship and in renewed scholarly attention to
84
questions of political economy, power, and inequality. Overlying this structural
focus, there has been a renewed interest among scholars in how law, structure,
and public policy create disparities of political power between different interest

80. See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN, supra note 62 (synthesizing historical, social science, and legal
literature, and case law on the use of urban planning, zoning, redlining, and other legal tools to construct
racial and economic segregation, and to systematically exclude minority communities from major
vehicles of wealth aggregation such as homeownership); Sarah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion:
Discriminationand Segregation Through Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J.
1934 (2015) (same); SHARKEY, supra note 62 (documenting the racialized intergenerational effects of
urban planning and economic segregation on economic opportunity).
81. See, e.g., KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST
NOTHING IN AMERICA (2015); DANIEL L. HATCHER, THE POVERTY INDUSTRY: THE EXPLOITATION
OF AMERICA'S MOST VULNERABLE CITIZENS (2016). For a classic statement of the problem, see
Michael Lipsky, BureaucraticDisentitlementin Social Welfare Programs,58 SOC. SERV. REV. 3 (1984)
(describing how administrative processes inhibit access to entitlements), and Vicki Lens, Bureaucratic
DisentitlementAfter Welfare Reform: Are FairHearingsthe Cure?, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
13, 54 (2005) (discussing how the 1996 welfare reform law contributed to bureaucratic disentitlement,
and assessing whether the pretermination hearings required by Goldberg v. Kelly provide meaningful
protection against bureaucratic disentitlement).
82. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 63, at 30-128 (connecting the rise of mass incarceration to
issues of inequality and political economy); Bell, supranote 63, at 2118 (2017) (theorizing part of the
problem of policing as one of "structural exclusion," which "corresponds with intersecting race, class,
and geographic marginalization"); Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff Introduction to THE NEW
CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 1, 4 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) (highlighting
"the role that the criminal system has long played in the collective generation and perpetuation of
national legacies of racism, sexism, classism, and other forms of systemic discrimination"); Jeffrey
Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarcerationin New York City Neighborhoods, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1551, 1554 (2003) (examining "social, economic, legal, and political mechanisms
through which spatial concentration transforms a spike in incarceration from an acute external shock
into an enduring internal feature of the neighborhood fabric"); Roberts, supra note 63, at 1598-1604
(2007) (describing the interlocking aspects of the "anti-democratic" nature of criminal justice).
83. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 61, at 1091 (pushing poverty law theorists to attend more to
structure); Cummings, supranote 33 at 1572-79 (describing how law and social movements scholarship
provides an analytic fiamework to address structural phenomena in the law through the interactions
between the law and collective social movements).
84. See, e.g., David Singh Grewal et al., Law andPoliticalEconomy: Towarda Manifesto, LAW
& POL. ECON. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://lpeblog.org/2017/11/06/law-and-political-economy-toward-amanifesto/ [https://perma.cc/96VA-RFBM] (calling for a renewed attention to questions of political
economy and power in shaping legal scholarship and linking to some examples of scholarship that does
so).
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groups and constituencies-and a focus on the need to design legal systems to
better balance power among those different groups and social movements.85
But while these larger and deeper structures are very much at the heart of
diagnoses of inequality and exclusion, they pose a particularly difficult challenge
for advocacy and reform efforts. Structures are often hidden, deeply embedded,
and diffuse, arising from the confluence of multiple patterns of law, policy, and
behavior. 86 And once diagnosed, these features also make structures difficult to
87
dismantle. This poses a problem for democratic action.
The dialectical relationship between structural inequalities and political
power compounds this difficulty: multiple layers of democratic and structural
exclusion reinforce each other, reproducing unequal, racialized systems of
justice and of governance. For example, when people directly affected by the
criminal legal system attempt to intervene in policy debates over criminal law
and procedure, they find their calls muted because they are members of a
population that has been systematically disenfranchised by the very systems of
criminal law that they aim to reform.88 And when groups historically relegated
to geographically segregated communities with subpar infrastructures attempt to
remedy those imbalances, they find themselves thwarted by the very resource
gaps they aim to close.89 The antidemocratic nature of our legal systems
reinforces structural inequality; the result is that increasing community
participation does not, on its own, truly tackle these deeply embedded structural
problems. Instead, movements are rethinking the notion of community
participation itself.
In the urgency and aspiration of these movements, real-time experiments
and innovations in strategies have emerged, aimed at contesting these deeper
structures. In the next Part, we highlight some illustrative examples of one

85. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, ConfrontingPower in PublicLaw, 130 HARv. L.REV. F. 1,2(2016)
(arguing for the shifting of power in public law by "creating new structures for citizens' collective
engagement with government"); Sameer Ashar & Annie Lai, Access to Power, 148 DEDALUs 82, 8284 (2019) (exploring how lawyers can contribute to the redistribution of power in society through
models of legal service); Levinson, supra note 34, at 33 (calling for legal scholars to address "basic
questions of where power is located in the American political system, how it should be distributed or
redistributed, and even what 'power' means or which kinds of power should matter for different
purposes").
86.

See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUSTicE 52 (2011) ("Structural

injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and institutions acting to pursue their particular
goals and interests .... ); K. Sabeel Rahman, Constructing and Contesting Structural Inequality, 5
CRmcAL ANALYSIS L. 99, 103 (2018) ("[A]ccumulated human choices congeal into a larger structure,
which places individuals in subordinate positions.").
87.
See RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION, supranote 12, at 84-88.
88.

See generally Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice, supra note 11, at 1610-15

(describing how attempts to democratize institutions within the criminal legal system, for example
through community policing, often reinscribe existing power imbalances rather than truly shift power).
89. See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN, supra note 62 (describing the systematic racial discrimination baked
into housing and urban policy over decades).
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particular type of strategy for contesting structure: the push for community
control over key institutions of local governance. This is by no means the only,
or even primary, strategy articulated by movement actors. Nor is it universally
embraced in movement circles. But the push for community control marks an
important departure from more traditional calls for "community participation" in
local governance. There is a distinctive approach to participation and power in
these movements' vision of participation. This is participation with a purpose,
seeking a share of authorship over those decisions that have material
90
repercussions for the welfare and well-being of groups of people, thereby
contesting dominant understandings of the purposes and priorities of governance
institutions themselves.
II.
CONTESTING STRUCTURE THROUGH COMMUNITY CONTROL

Part I put forth a particular vision of democracy, one echoed in current
movement work, that emphasizes contestation and control over drivers of
structural inequality. But what would such a shift entail when it comes to on-theground governance policies? In this Part, we seek a tentative answer to this
question by focusing on institutional designs put forth by movement actors
themselves. Movement visions found in the contemporary push for "community
control" over both policing and local economic development exhibit a rich
ferment over questions of power, democracy, and social change. These
movement visions exemplify a self-conscious effort among social-change
activists to connect deep engagement with the historical and structural drivers of
racial and economic inequality to novel demands for community control over
these underlying structures.
With policing, movement actors have focused not just on top-down policy
recommendations, for example, use-of-force policies, but also on creating
civilian oversight institutions with real power to create policing policy and to
discipline individual officers. The quest is not community policing, or even
civilian review, but rather civilian control. Similarly, in battles over urban
inequality, movement actors are beginning to experiment with measures that do
more than seek policy outcomes-such as increased developer investments in
local neighborhoods or mandated "local hiring" provisions-to develop
governance arrangements in which communities themselves play a more direct
role in controlling and monitoring development projects.

90.

See Peter Houtzager & Lucie E. White, The Long Arc of PragmaticEconomic and Social

Rights Advocacy, in STONES OF HOPE, supranote 31, at 172, 172-73 ("Having an impact on structural
injustice requires more than winning lawsuits or sparking social justice mobilization; it requires that
such strategic victors achieve innovation in the institutions that provide food, shelter, healthcare,
housing, jobs, and the like to impoverished people, on the ground." (citation omitted)).
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"Community control" is not in itself a new strategy; indeed, the 1960s and
1970s saw widespread calls for community control from social movements
aimed at combatting systemic racial and economic inequality. 91 And in the
decade before the emergence of the Movement for Black Lives, Black organizers
in the South resurrected the idea of communal economic democracy in places
like Jackson, Mississippi. 92 But the last six years have seen a resurgence in the
demand for community control, buoyed in large part by the burgeoning strength
of local social movements in our "movement moment."93 The respective pushes
for community control over policing and over economic development illustrate
the ways in which local social movements seek not just to shift policy, but also
to contest structure and power inequality. Indeed, they suggest that from the
movement point of view, to seek only input into policy, without power over it,
is a hollow approach to legal change.
The local politics of these interventions also tell an important story. It is at
the local level that these movements have been able to target a greater degree of
political power and influence, both through grassroots organizing and through
connections to potential allies and interlocutors in city councils, mayors' offices,
and other positions of real authority. Thus, we reference the city of Oakland in
both the policing and development examples below; that is in part because the
alignment of a reform-minded city council and mayor created an opening for
these kinds of demands to be taken seriously. At the same time, these strategies
do not track partisan divisions; in some of these cases, such as the battle for
police reform in Chicago, movement demands for greater community control are
framed in opposition to liberal democratic leaders like Mayor Rahm Emmanuel.
Indeed, one of the lessons from our examples below is that to simply look at the
winning institutional models that emerge from democratic or left-leaning local
governments is to miss out on the more radical nature of the movement-driven
institutional visions of power-shifting in local governance.

91.
For a summary of this trend, see ALAN A. ALTSHULER, COMMUNrrY CONTROL: THE
BLACK DEMAND FOR PARTICIPATION IN LARGE AMERICAN CITIES (1970). The term "community
control" was especially prevalent within the Black Power Movement in the 1960s and 1970s with
respect to community control of schools. See Barbara R. Hatton, Schools and Black Community
Development: A Reassessment of Community Control,9 EDUC. & URB. SOC'Y 215 (1977) (describing
this push for community control of schools within the Black Power Movement); see also notes 102106, infra, and accompanying text (describing the Black Panthers's push for community control of the
police in the 1970s).
92. See Kamau Franklin, The New Southern Strategy: The Politics of Self-determinationin the
South, in JACKSON RISING: THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY AND BLACK SELF-

DETERMINATION IN JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI (Cooperation Jackson et al. eds., 2017).
93. See Amna A. Akbar, Law's Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 352, 356-60 (2015) (defining the movement that began in 2015).
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PoliceAccountability: From Review to Control

At the center of the push for police accountability post-Ferguson are social
movement actors calling for the formation of new institutions that create
communal power over policing policies and decisions. This push for police
accountability has gained incredible momentum in the last five years, as national
attention to police violence against people of color, especially African
Americans, has sparked a public debate about police policies such as the use of
deadly force 94 and police surveillance of Black and brown people. 95 Since 2015,
leaders at all levels of government have pushed for police reforms by, for
example, revisiting their use-of-force policies and shifting disciplinary processes
for officers who use deadly force. 96 But movement actors are not just focused on

changing policing policies, procedures, or laws; they are equally focused on
transforming the landscape of power in policing. The result has been a focus on
the potential of a strong civilian control process. From Atlanta to Los Angeles to
Houston to Nashville, activists have honed in on the potential of civilian control
of policing to promote racial justice beyond the acts of individual officers.
Sometimes movements have focused on the creation of new civilian review

institutions, 97 and other times they have put forth scathing critiques of existing

94. See, e.g., PHILLIP ATIBA GOFF ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY, THE SCIENCE OF
JUSTICE: RACE, ARRESTS, AND POLICE USE OF FORCE, CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY (2016),
https://www.issuelab.org/resources/25200/25200.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ59-ELZU].
95. See, e.g., Timothy Williams, Can 30,000 CamerasHelp Solve Chicago's CrimeProblem?,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/26/us/chicago-police26,
2018),
TIMES
(May
N.Y.
surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/FE89-FUTQ].
See generally RAM SUBRAMANIAN & LEAH SKRZYPIEC, To PROTECT AND SERVE: NEW
96.
JUST.
(2017),
VERA
INST.
POLICING
REFORM,
STATE-LEVEL
TRENDS
IN
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/041417-PolicingTrendsReport-web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZF66-IPSK] (summarizing trends among seventy-nine police reform bills passed by
at least thirty-four states between 2015 and 2016); The State of Justice Reform 2017: The State of
Policing, VERA INST. JUST. (2017), https://www.vera.org/state-of-justice-reform/2017/the-state-ofpolicing [https://permacc/TJY8-XZ3N] (describing reforms at state and local levels across the country).
Federal reform efforts, however, have been all but eliminated under the Trump Administration. See id
97.
For example, in Houston, a call for a civilian review board with subpoena power is part of a
new Right2Justice Coalition. See Brian Rogers, Houston Activists Callfor CriminalJustice Reform,
Hous. CHRON. (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Houstonactivists-call-for-criminal-justice-reform-9145919.php [https://perma.cc/3L54-Z5NR] (describing how
"more than a dozen activists called a press conference to demand independent prosecutors to investigate
police shootings overseen by civilian review boards with subpoena power"); see also Vision and
http://fergusonaction.com/demands/
ACTION,
Demands,
FERGUSON
National
[https://perma.cc/HWM5-JNE5] (demanding community oversight of policing and discipline);
Community OversightNow Launches CharterReferendum Petitionfor a Community Oversight Board
50 Years After the Death ofDr.Martin LutherKing, Jr., COMMUNITY OVERSIGHT NASHVILLE (June 6,
https://communityoversightnashville.wordpress.com/2018/06/06/conmunity-oversight-now2018),
launches-charter-referendum-petition-for-a-community-oversight-board-50-years-after-the-death-ofdr-martin-luther-king-jr [https://perma.cc/9QTG-3DMR] (launching a winning petition drive for a
charter referendum to create an independent Community Oversight Board (COB) with compulsory and
investigative powers).
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institutions of civilian review. 98 Activists behind all of these pushes have seized
on the idea of community control of the police as a potential lever of powershifting.
This push for civilian control of policing is intimately connected to
concerns with structural and historical inequalities in local governance. The
Vision for Black Lives lays it out plainly:
We demand a world where those most impacted in our communities
control the laws, institutions, andpolicies that are meant to serve us from our schools to our local budgets, economies, police departments,
and our land - while recognizing that the rights and histories of our
Indigenous family must also be respected. This includes... [d]irect
democratic community control of local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies, ensuring that communities most harmed by
destructive policing have the power to hire and fire officers, determine
disciplinary action, control budgets and policies, and subpoena relevant
99
agency information.
Here the point is not simply to revise police policies or push for
constitutional policing, but rather to ensure "direct democratic community
control" of law enforcement. These groups are seeking freedom from the
domination of their local governments and looking for power over how it
operates-not for the sake of control, but because shifts in power are necessary
in order to push back against the longstanding history of racialized state violence.
For these groups, power, structure, and histories of inequality are inseparable
from one another. 10 0 As two longtime activists explain, "This is a call for
Community Control over Police as a means of shifting power, enforcing
democracy, deconstructing the historic relationship between the police and the

98. For example, movement actors in Atlanta have consistently put forward a strong critique of
a local civilian review board hailed as progressive by others. See Gloria Tatum, Atlanta Citizens Review
Board Gets on Activists' Last Nerve, ATLANTA PROGRESsIVE NEWS (May 15, 2015)
http://atlantaprogressivenews.com/2015/05/15/atlanta-citizens-review-board-gets-on-activists-lastnerve/ [https://perma.cc/WA3M-95AF]. In Los Angeles, the local Black Lives Matter chapter has
worked to call attention to the potential of recent reforms to re-entrench inequalities. See David Zahniser,
After Election Loss, Criticsof CharterAmendment C Callfor Sweeping Review of LAPD Discipline,
L.A. TIES (May 17, 2017), https://www.latimes.comilocal/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-discipline-measure20170517-story.html [https://perma.cc/GLK7-5FU2]. According to one community leader, "[w]e refuse
to let the police union and Police Commission distort the meaning of 'civilian' and stack the deck in
favor of bad officers." Id
99. Community Control,supranote 3.
100. See id.("Lack of empowered civilian oversight with [law enforcement] creates significant
roadblocks to law enforcement transparency and accountability and prevents any means for
communities most impacted by lethal force, excessive force and misconduct to effectively reduce other
types of violence."); see also Akbar, supra note 31, at 433 ("[T]he emphasis on community control,
rather than simply on community input, challenges how the concept of community is conventionally
deployed in criminal law reform conversations.").
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Black community, and re-imagining a social force designed to actually protect
10 1
and serve its population as policy."
This call for community control of the police is not new; it was the center
of the call by the Black Panthers and other radical activists of color in the 1960s
102
The heart of this historical push
to reclaim control of their local governments.
for Black community control was the idea that local police precincts should be
independent of elites who are elected or appointed at the city or county level,
transferring power over policing to the people who interact with police officers
every day on the streets. This would simultaneously build political power and
promote safety. 103 Although few local jurisdictions in the 1960s actually
implemented true community control, a weaker form of "civilian review" of
police disciplinary decisions did spread as a method of police reform.1°4 In
Berkeley, California, for instance, voters in 1971 rejected a community control
referendum by a two-to-one margin but two years later approved a referendum
for a "Police Review Commission" with independent authority to investigate
police complaints. 105 Overall, localities did not implement "community control";
instead, they created institutions of "civilian review" that largely kept power in
06
the hands of the police and city or county officials.'
By the end of the twentieth century, civilian oversight had become a
significant feature of much policing in the United States, with 80 percent of large
1 7
This vision of civilian
police departments having some form of oversight.

101.

Adams & Rameau, supra note 5, at 530-38; see also Community Control, supranote 3.

102. See, e.g., Police Petition, BERKELEY MONITOR, Aug.
http://www.itsabouttimebpp.com/CommunityControl/pdf/CommunityControl

8, 1970, at 12,
Police Nol .pdf

[https://perma.cc/NNP4-UM38]; Bobby Seale, Community Control of Police Was on the Berkeley

Ballot in 1969, SF. BAY VIEw (Aug. 13, 2015), https://sfbayview.com/2015/08/bobby-seale[https://perma.cc/KR3T-A96A].
community-control-of-police-was-on-the-berkeley-ballot-in-1969/
Like the Movement for Black Lives, the idea of community in the Black Panther philosophy was not
just about community control of the police, but also schools and other local government services. See
Glen Ford, Opinion, The Complexities of Black Community Control of Police, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 13,

2015), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/29100-the-complexities-of-black-community-control-ofpolice [https://permacc/G7XV-G73G] (connecting current demands for community control of the
police to the history of similar Black Panther demands).
103. See generally ALTSHULER, supra note 91, at 13-66; Rita Mae Kelly, Sources of the
Community Control over Police Movement, 7 J. VOLUNTARY ACTION RES. 25 (1978). See also Elinor
Ostrom & Gordon Whitaker, Does Local Community Control of Police Make a Difference? Some
PreliminaryFindings, 17 AM. J. POL. Sci. 48 (1973).

104. The idea that independent agencies run by civilians should oversee or monitor the newly
professionalized police emerged as early as the 1920s, and was then endorsed by the Wickersham
Commission in 1931. See WALKER, supranote 6.

105. Id. at 32-33; see also Redmond, supra note 5, at 229-30 (discussing this Berkeley history);
Seale, supranote 102 (describing the community control referendum in Berkeley).
106. See Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of
Democracy, 2016 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 615, 636-37 (2016) ("Other than the Berkeley effort,...
community control proved to be too radical an idea about the proper form of governing the police and
gained no traction in other communities.").
107.

WALKER, supranote 6, at 40.
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review usually comprises civilian commissions reviewing complaints about
individual officer misconduct and participating in some way in the decision
whether to discipline the offending officer. 108 In practice, however, the civilian
review boards that emerged in the 1970s and then replicated throughout the
country were notoriously ineffectual, 10 9 and their influence waned with the rise
of "community policing" in the 1980s and 1990s.11 ° In a 2016 study, Udi Ofer
found that of the nation's fifty largest police departments, only twenty-four had
a form of civilian oversight of the police, and of those, all but nine had a majority
of the board nominated or controlled by the mayor or the police chief.1 11 In recent
years, though, many jurisdictions have placed renewed emphasis on reforming
or designing new police accountability institutions with civilians at their helm.
And social movement actors have been at the forefront of pushing for civilian
112
control-for true power over policing, rather than just input into it.
In what follows, we highlight two recent debates over local ordinances to
create civilian oversight of the police that exemplify this focus in jurisdictions
with longstanding policies of "community policing." The first, in Chicago,
reveals a contrast between a liberal view of civilian oversight that prioritizes
conversations with communities-but leaves policy-making to technocrats-and
a movement-driven vision that truly shifts power. And the second, in Oakland,
demonstrates how movement actors are pushing their local governments to think
carefully about who "the people" are when transferring power to civilians.
1.

Defining the Scope of Community Oversight: the 2016 Chicago Debate

Like many American cities, in 2016 Chicago found itself with a police
department mired in scandals both old and new, including the police killing of
civilian Laquan MacDonald and revelations surrounding Homan Square, the
"black site" for secret interrogations conducted by the Chicago Police

108. See generally DE ANGELIS ET AL., supra note 6 (detailing a range of civilian oversight
models).
109. See David Alan Sklansky, Is the ErclusionaryRule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567,
572 (2008) ("lronically.... one of the reasons citizen review panels have spread so broadly is that they
have almost always proven much more sympathetic to rank-and-file officers than the unions feared and
than most of the original backers of the idea expected,"); e.g., ROBERT A. PERRY, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, MISSION FAILURE: CIVILIAN REVIEW OF POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY 1994-2006 1, 45-48
(2007),
https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/publications/nyclu pub-mission-failure.pdf
[https://permacc/WT3J-6B3H] (criticizing the New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board for
being ineffectual).
110. But cf WALKER, supra note 6, at 44-45, 53-54 (arguing that evaluating the history of
civilian oversight of the police is more complicated than most commentators acknowledge).
111.
Ofer, supra note 16, at 1041-42.
112. Cf Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, DemocraticPolicing,90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827,
1833 (2015) (arguing that police departments have never been subject to true democratic control, only
to ex post mechanisms of review).
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Department (CPD). 113 While Mayor Rahm Emmanuel heralded his own form of
community policing,1 14 the City Council, in contrast, responded by considering
the creation of a new institution to review the actions of the police department.
Whereas the Democratic elites who controlled the City Council sought a
"review" model, in which a new Civilian Office of Police Accountability
(COPA) could investigate alleged misconduct, movement actors to their left
sought a "control" model, in which civilians had control over police departments
at the neighborhood level. 1 5 In the words of those activists: "We believe
democratic civilian control of the police means the community tells the police
1 16

what to do."

The main grassroots group behind the push for a Civilian Office of Police
Accountability has been the Chicago Alliance Against Racist and Political
Repression (CAARPR), a group founded in 1973 as part of the mass movement
to free Angela Davis.1 17 Building on the group's longstanding presence
organizing in largely African American neighborhoods, CAARPR now works
with Black Lives Matter Chicago, the Black Youth Project 100, and other local
groups to push for a transformative vision of how policing can look in
Chicago. 1 8 Their 2016 proposed ordinance to create a Civilian Police
Accountability Council (CPAC), which was sponsored by the most progressive
1 19
members of the city council, would have created a new police accountability
council with elected positions drawn from each district and forbidden individuals

See generally CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & N. DIST. OF ILL., U.S.
113.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (2017),

https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download [https://perma.cc/SW6Y-X5XY] (summarizing the
findings of the DOJ investigation of the CPD); Bernard E. Harcourt, In Rahm Emanuel's Chicago
14, 2015),
Surveillance State, Controlling the Data Is Key, INTERCEPT (Dec.
https://theitercept.com/2015/12/14/in-rahm-emanuels-chicago-surveillance-state-controling-the-datais-key/ [https://perma.cc/MXSR-P65Z] (analyzing Chicago Mayor Rahm Emmanuel's response to the
shooting of Laquan McDonald); Homan Square, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.con/usnews/homan-square [https://perma.cc/U5KH-6H2K] (last visited June 9, 2020).
114. See Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice, supra note 11, at 1615-16 (describing
Emmanuel's Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) initiative).
115. See D.D. Guttenplan, This Chicago PoliticianIs Showing How to Govern from the Left,
NATION (July 13, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/meet-chicagos-movement-politician/
[https://perma.cc/5ZWX-HZMMI].
116.

NAT'L ALL. AGAINST RACIST & POL. REPRESSION, THE PEOPLE'S GUIDE TO AN ELECTED

htp://naarpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/CPACB-W PeoplesGuideMarch2015.pdf
(2015),
[https://perma.cc/6CAA-YW5D].
117.

See

CHI. ALL.

AGAINST

RACIST

&

POL.

REPRESSION,

https://www.caarpr.org/

[https://perma.cc/LYY2-6GZH]; Redmond, supra note 5, at 232-34 (detailing the history of CAARPR
and its current push for community control).
118. See, e.g., Press Release, We Charge Genocide, Community Policing is Not the Answer (Oct.
http://wechargegenocide.org/press-release-comnunity-policing-is-not-the-answer2015),
28,
countercaps-report/ [https://perma.cc/6JFL-X99K] (listing organizations working together on a
Counter-CAPS report to expose the limits of community policing in Chicago).
119. See Guttenplan, supra note 115 (describing progressive councilman Carlos Ramirez-Rosa's
support of the CPAC proposal).
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with personal or professional connections to police officers from serving on the
Council. 120 And the CPAC would have had tremendous power: to appoint the
superintendent, to adopt rules for police conduct, and to sign off on all
disciplinary decisions. 12 1 Essentially, the proposed Chicago ordinance would
have created a new body, much like an elected school board, to govern the local
122
police department.
Although the movement-driven CPAC proposal had substantial support in
the City Council, it ultimately lost to a proposal backed by the mayoral
administration of Rahm Emmanuel. Under Emmanuel's Civilian Office of Police
Accountability, which began operations in 2017,123 the powers of the civilianstaffed review commission remain mainly investigatory, including the capacity
to issue subpoenas and investigate both individual allegations of misconduct and
patterns of misconduct. 124 Although the COPA makes policy recommendations,
these recommendations are nonbinding. 125 Under this winning setup, the power
goes to a new, independent "Inspector General" and the superintendent of police
who can decide whether to heed the advice and recommendations of the civilian
26
council. 1
The contrasts between the winning 2016 "review" model and the
movement-driven "control" model exemplify the ways in which movement
actors are pushing for countervailing power in the struggle over police violence.
Although the Emmanuel review model recognizes the need for transparency,
public participation, and independent oversight of everyday policing, 2 ' the
movement-driven control model seeks more direct shifts in power. As CAARPR
wrote in a pamphlet promoting its model, the goal is to move away from "closed
loops of power" in writing police rules and disciplining individual officers. 128

120. Amendment of Municipal Code of Chicago by Adding New Chapter 2-83 Entitled "Civilian
Police Accountability Council," CHI. CITY COUNcIL 02016-5707, at 1-3 (2016).
121. Id., CI. CrrY CoUNcL 02016-5707 at 3-8.
122. See id, CH. CITY CoUNcIL 02016-5707 at 1, 3-8; CHI. ALL. AGAINST RACIST AND POL.
REPRESSION, supra note 116.
123.
See Press Release, Civilian Office of Police Accountability, The Civilian Office of Police
Accountability Is Officially Open (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.chicagocopa.org/press/the-civilianoffice-of-police-accountability-is-officially-open/
[https://perma.cc/8Z38-9SS8]; Annie Sweeney,
Civilian Office of Police Accountability to Launch in September, Replace Long-CriticizedIPRA, CHI.
TR1B. (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-copa-start-date-met20170412-story.html [https://perma.cc/LDE2-95CF].
124. Cm., ILL., MUN. CODE chs. 2-78-110, -120 (2019).
125. See id. chs. 2-78-110,-130(b).
126. See id. chs. 2-56-010, -205; id. ch. 2-78-120, -130; Municipal Ordinance,CIVILIAN OFF.
POLICE
AccouNTABILrry,
https://www.chicagocopa.org/about-copa/ordinance
[https://perma.cc/KA82-TS7S].
127. See CH., ILL., MUN. CODE chs. 2-78-120; Chi., Ill., Ordinance S02016-6309, at 1-2 (Sept.
13,2016).
128. Before CPAC - ClosedLoops of Power and the Chicago Police Department,NAT'L ALL.
AGAINST

RACIST

&

POL.

REPRESSION,

content/uploads/2013/12/BeforeCPAC closed loopsjpower.png

http://naarpr.org/wp-
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The elected, all-civilian council would have "re-writ[ten] the police 'rulebook'
deciding what CPD can do on the streets," investigated all complaints, and
129
Although this vision did not win
wielded final authority regarding discipline.
the day, the on-the-ground organizing behind the proposal reflected its status as
a true contender in local Chicago politics: out of four competing proposals, it
was the only one that came close to defeating the COPA model that ultimately
won.130 And movement actors have not given up the fight; to the contrary, in
2018, in response to the demands of movement actors, the Chicago City Council
held a set of hearings on reforming COPA, or replacing it, to give it more
power.131 In 2019, the CPAC was once again before the Chicago City Councilhad in 2016.132
with twice the number of co-sponsors as it
2.

The Pushfor Community Control of the Police in Oakland

A similar debate has played out in
City Council responded to community
violence by creating a new institution
department. Recent debates in Oakland

Oakland, where, like in Chicago, the
pressure to rein in racialized police
to review the actions of the police
over the details of the new Civilian

[https://web.archive.org/web/20160813151920/http://naarpr.org/wp-

content/uploads/2013/12/BeforeCPAC closed loopspower.png];

see

also

Civilian

Police

Accountability Council,NAT'L ALL. AGAINST RACIST & POL. REPRESSION, http://naarpr.org/civilianpolice-accountabiity-coucil-cpac/ [https://perma.cc/QRV3-CPSN] (outlining CPAC's powers and
duties).
129. See Chicago: Democrat-Led Cops Continue Racist Killing Spree, INTERNATIONALIST
http://www.intemationalist.org/chicopskeepkilfingblackpeople1808.html
2018)
(Aug.

[https://perma.cc/F967-XCLM]; Amendment of Municipal Code of Chicago by Adding New Chapter

2-83 Entitled "Civilian Police Accountability Council," CHI. CITY COUNCIL 02016-5707, at 3, 8 (2016).
130. See Charles Preston & Jeremy Borden, What Went Wrong? Inside City Council's Police
Reform Fight, CITY BUREAU, https://www.citybureau.org/what-went-wrong [https://perma.cc/MH7K-

3DJC] (describing how the two police oversight proposals other than COPA and CPAC did not come

to a vote in the council at all).
See Claudia Morell, Got Something to Say About Police Oversight? Here Are the 4 Plans,
131.

WBEZ 91.5 CHI. (May 15, 2018), https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/got-something-to-sayabout-pofice-oversight-here-are-the-4-plans/70c7206b-e7f8-4b43-958b-4c90b9a237df
[https://perna.cc/DXD9-RDVZ]; Annie Sweeney, FirstPublic Hearingon Civilian Oversightof CPD
2018),
16,
(May
TRIB.
CHI.
Protest,
Amid
Up
Breaks
Abruptly
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-community-oversight-commissionhearing-20180516-story.html [https://perma.cc/9DA5-CGQC] (describing how two movement-written
proposals for a police review agency are now being debated in the Chicago City Council, along with a
different Emanuel-backed plan).
132. See Amendment of Municipal Code Title 2 by Adding New Chapter 2-83 Entitled "Civilian
Police Accountability Council," Cm. CITY COUNCIL 02019-3943 (2019); Matt Masterson, Chicago
Alderman Renews Push for Elected Police Oversight Council, W'TrW NEWS (May 14, 2019),
https://news.wttw.com/2019/05/14/chicago-alderman-renews-push-elected-police-oversight-council
[https://perma.cc/VYB2-4YRX]. This time, however, there is a competing community-driven proposal
for civilian oversight, from the Grassroots Alliance for Police Accountability (GAPA), to keep COPA
but create a Commission for Public Safety and Accountability to oversee COPA and the police board.
See Aneel Chablani, Community Police Oversight Is Long Past Due, CRAIN'S Cm. Bus. (June 10,
https://www.chicagobusiness.conlightfoot-100/community-polire-oversight-long-past-due
2019),
supra.
[https://perma.cc/4T26-SBXH] (distinguishing GAPA from other reform proposals); Masterson,
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Police Commission and the Community Police Review Agency take on a number
of similar themes, including the independence of the commission from the mayor
and the amount of power that the civilian-controlled agency will have. Beyond
that, the debates also concern the who of civilian control: Just who are the
civilians, and how can we ensure that they come from the communities most
affected by current policing policies? This question headlined discussion in City
Council forums and local newspapers in the summer of 2017 as movement actors
pressured the City Council for a civilian review board operated independently
from the mayor, comprised of people from affected communities, and armed
with resources at its disposal.' 33
Like in Chicago, Oakland has a long history of Black activism against
police brutality and for community control of the police.13 4 And, like in Chicago,
recent years have seen a continual push from activists for robust civilian review
and control of the police department. In 2010, for example, a coalition of
Oakland grassroots organizations, dissatisfied with the existing internal affairs
process for dealing with allegations of police misconduct, pushed for the
formation of a Citizens Police Review Board. 135 The proposal passed the City
Council in 2011 but was only activated in 2015-with a milder version than the
language in the original statute proposed by movement actors. 136 Then, in 2016,
voters overwhelmingly approved a referendum to create a new Civilian Police
Commission to oversee the police department's policies and procedures. 137 The
referendum granted the new Commission the authority to terminate the police
chief and created a new Community Police Review Agency to investigate and
recommend discipline of individual officers.13 8 The measure succeeded largely
133. See Darwin BondGraharn, CiviliansAre Finally in Charge of ComplaintsAgainst Oakland
Cops.
Kind
of
Not
Yet,
E.
BAY
EXPRESS
(May
20,
2015),
https://www.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2015/05/20/civilians-are-ftnally-in-charge-ofcomplaints-against-oakland-cops-kind-of-not-yet [https://perma.cc/GA58-S46B].
134.

See generally JOSHUA BLOOM & WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., BLACK AGAINST EMPIRE: THE

HISTORY AND POLITICS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY 45-63 (2013) (detailing the killing of Denzil
Dowell by police and the rise of the Black Panther Party in the 1960s); Paul Harris, OaldandPolice:
Controversial History Sets Tone for City's Discord, GUARDIAN (Oct
26, 2011),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/201 1/oct/26/oakland-police-department-black-community
[https://perma.cc!3MU7-YN44] (highlighting instances of killings by Oakland police over the past
several decades).
135. Don Mitchell et. al, "Broken Windows Is Not the Panacea": Common Sense, Good Sense,
andPoliceAccountability in American Cities, in POLICING THE PLANET 237, 256-57 (Jordan T. Camp

& Christina Heatherton eds., 2016) (describing interview with policing activist involved in a coalition
of Oakland organizations seeking police accountability and presenting proposal to the Oakland City
Council in 2010).
136. Id.
137. See Lisa Fernandez, Oakland Approves Civilian Police Commission to Investigate
Misconduct, NBC BAY AREA (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/OaklandApproves-Civilian-Police-Conmission-Measure-LL40054461 1.html [https://perma.ccN7F6-CXEU].
138. See id; Oakland, California,Civilian Police Commission, Measure LL (November 2016),
BALLOTPEDIA,

https://balotpedia org/Oakland,_Califomia,_CivilianPoliceCommission,

Measure LL_(November
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due to the organizing work of the Coalition for Police Accountability and other
grassroots organizations with longstanding roots in the struggle for racial and
139
economic justice.
Since voters approved a general referendum to create the Civilian Police
Commission and the Community Police Review Agency, the City Council has
40
The coalition of
worked to finalize how these new bodies will operate.
activists that had been the driving force behind the new Commission
simultaneously criticized the City Council's leading version of the enabling
ordinance, putting forth a competing vision. For the Coalition for Police
Accountability, the key sticking points concern the who of who gets to be on the
Commission: first, activists pushed to ensure that the mayor does not control a
141
and second, they sought to remove a provision
majority of the Commission;
of the new law that would require criminal background checks of all potential
commissioners. 142 Finally, it concerns the Coalition that the legislation does not
not
mandate robust staffing of the Commission and that the Commission will
143
staffers.
have much power if it does not have the resources to hire its own
This debate surfaces important questions about the constitution of the
polity-the "civilians"-deserving of inclusion in the project of "civilian
2016) [https://perma.cc/CMM3-7N7U]. Specifically, the measure required that the City amend its
charter to create both a civilian commission to oversee the Police Department "by reviewing and
proposing changes to [Oakland Police] Department policies and procedures... and having the authority
to terminate the Chief of Police for cause" and a Community Police Review Agency "to investigate
complaints of police misconduct and recommend discipline." See Oakland, California,Civilian Police
Commission, MeasureLL (November 2016), supra.

139. See Luis Daniel Gasc6n & Aaron Roussell, The Limits of Community Policing 221 (2019)
(describing this influence).
140. See, e.g., Darwin BondGraham, Oakland Officials Wrestle for Control over New Police
2018),
20,
(June
EXPRESS
BAY
E.
Positions,
Staff
Commission

2
https://www.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/ 018/06/20/oakland-officials-wrestle-forcontrol-over-new-police-commission-staff-positions [https://perma.cc/GJL2-AM25]; Jaime Omar

Yassin, Commissioner Claims City Administrator and City Attorney Are Obstructing Police
2019),
25,
(Apr.
GROUP
NEWS
POST
Commission,

https://postnewsgroup.com/2019/04/25/commissioner-claims-city-administrator-and-city-attomey-areobstructing-police-commission/ [https://perma.cc/W7Z6-LWEA].
141. See Coalition for Police Accountability, Amendments to Enabling Legislation for Police
Legislation],
Enabling
to
Amendments
[hereinafter
2017)
(June
Commission
20
17/06/proposed-amendments-6-8https://coalitionforpohceaccountability.files.wordpress.com/
rg.doc [https://perma.cc/WKY5-6UKS]; see also BondGraham, supra note 140 (describing the fight in
city council over the language of the ordinance regarding independence from the mayor).
142. Coalition for Police Accountability, Coalition Proposed Ordinance of6 June 13, 2017 (June
13, 2017), https://coalitionforpoliceaccountabihity.files.wordpress.com/2017/0 /coalItion-substituteordinance-6-13-17-lb-6-8.doc [https://perma.cc/RB9P-U3A8]; Amendments to Enabling Legislation,
supra note 141.
143. As one movement leader told the press: "There's a reason for the expression, 'The devil is
in the details."' Darwin BondGraham, CrucialLegislationfor New OaklandPolice Commission Stalls
in Committee as Activists and Councilmembers Fight Over Rules, E. BAY EXPRESS (June 14, 2017),

https://www.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2017/06/14/crucial-legislation-for-newoakland-police-commission-sta s-in-cmmittee-as-activists-and-councilmembers-fght-over-rules
[https://perma.cc/ULB4-LUUG].
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control." 144 The enabling legislation, as enacted, states that the selection panel to
pick the civilian commissioners will be "broadly representative of Oakland's
diversity and... represent communities experiencing the most frequent contact
with the Department." 145 Current and former police officers, as well as current or
former representatives of a police officer labor union, are excluded from
serving. 146 But the legislation also requires a criminal record check, a provision
that would be taken out of the amended bill put forth by the activists.147 Although
this debate has not yet been settled, initial flyers recruiting applicants to apply
for the Commission encouraged formerly incarcerated people to apply. 48 (For
their part, the police do not like the idea; the president of the Oakland Police
Officer's Associated penned an op-ed titled "Are you serious, recruiting felons
for Oakland Police Commission?"' 149) This debate centers on who we mean when
we call for civilian control of the police: those who have been most affected by
the harms of mass incarceration, or those who are able to claim that they are law50
abiding and have professional experience to make them qualified to serve?
Activists underscore this question, asking that Oakland take its history of
disempowering incarcerated people and their families into account when giving
power over the police to the new Commission.
The struggles in Oakland, Chicago, and throughout the country
demonstrate that many movement actors have moved beyond trying to solve the
problem of police violence with model rules for use of force, stronger discipline,
or any other top-down strategy of reining in excessive police violence. They have
for the most part moved beyond traditional ideas of "community policing."' 51
Instead, many movement actors have pushed toward bottom-up power-building,
often through the search for community control of the police. To be sure,

144. On the exclusion of marginalized populations from reigning ideas of which people are
worthy of inclusive public participation in criminal justice, see Simonson, The Placeof "the People,"
supra note 11 at 270-86.
145. OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 2.45.030 (2019).
146. See Application for Position of Commissioner, CITY OF OAKLAND, https://cao94 612.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Poice-Commission-2019-Application-With-Translations-Due6.17.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/A255-3FPZ].
147. See OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 2.45.060; Amendments to Enabling Legislation,
supra note 141.
148. David DeBolt, More than 100 Apply for Powerful Oakland Police Commission, E. BAY
TllffiS (July 21, 2017), http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2017/07/21/hundreds-apply-for-powerfuloakland-police-commission/ [https://perma.cc/NLM3-8R33].
149. Barry Donelan, Opinion, Are you serious, recruiting felons for Oakland Police
Commission?, E. BAY TIMES (June 25, 2017), http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2017/06/25/opinion-

convicted-felons-on-new-police-commission-really/ [https://perma.cc/RU36-9T37].
150. This question-who comprises "the people" who count in the democratic processes of
criminal procedure and criminal law-echoes throughout a number of other current tactics of movement
actors, including community bail funds, participatory defense, and courtwatching. For an analysis of
these questions, see Simonson, The Place of "the People,"supra note 11 at 266-70.
151.
See, e.g., Press Release, We Charge Genocide, supra note 118 (reporting on the wideranging critique of community policing in Chicago from social movement actors).
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"community control of the police" is not the central rallying cry of every local
group pushing for racial justice. Many cities have chosen to seek out other
inroads in the fight for power, rather than focus their attention on civilian review
at all. Moreover, whether community control is the ideal form of democratic
15 2
and
governance for policing remains far from a given in both movement
153
But in many cities, including Oakland, Chicago, Newark,
scholarly circles.
Houston, Nashville, and Los Angeles, the call for community control represents
1 54
part of a multi-pronged approach to tackle structural racism in policing.
Social movement actors who focus on community control have brought into
public debate important questions worth highlighting: whether community
review boards must be of the people, drawn from the very populations most
affected by police violence; whether they must be independentof mayors, police
chiefs, and other dominating figures; and whether they must have power, more
than simply input, to create rules rather than to advise on rules; to impose
discipline on officers rather than suggest discipline; and to investigate, subpoena,
and tell the public what they learn. 155 The political climate today has created a
unique opportunity for some jurisdictions to tackle some of these questions at
the local government level. Nevertheless, most jurisdictions remain far from
these governance arrangements envisioned by the people who live with police
violence every day.
B. EquitableDevelopment: From Mandates to Oversight
Movement advocates on the ground have also experimented with
emphasizing community control as a way to tackle structural inequalities in
urban development. As in the case of police reform, cities represent central sites
in battles over economic inequality, economic development, investment, and
ZERO,
CAMPAIGN
Solutions,
e.g.,
152. See,
[https://perma.cc/NZZ2-FXKT]
https://www.joincampaignzero.org/solutions#solutionsoverview
(describing civilian oversight as only one often central tenets in the push for police reform).
For alternative scholarly perspectives on democratizing policing, see, for example, Bell,
153.
supra note 63, at 2143-46 (proposing democratizing the police through a combination of public
rulemaking, transparency, and reconciliation); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supranote 112, at 1891-1903
(arguing for administrative rulemaking as a way to ensure democratic policing and popular input);
Tracey Meares, Policingand ProceduralJustice: Shaping Citizens'Identities to Increase Democratic
Participation,111 NW. U. L. REV. 1525, 1526-35 (2017) (arguing for a focus on procedural justice as
a way of furthering democracy); and Maria Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, 114 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1, 48-59 (2019) (arguing that inspectors general are best suited to hold police accountable);
Christopher Slobogin, Policingas Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 134-40 (2016) (arguing for
public rulemaking).
154. See generallyTERRANCE LANEY & JANAE BoNsu, BLACK YOUTH PROJECT 100, AGENDA
TO

KEEP

Us

SAFE

9

(2016),

http://agendatobuildblackfutures.org/wp-

[https://perma.cc/FZ5Xcontent/uploads/2016/01/BYP100-Agenda-to-Keep-Us-Safe-AKTUS.pdf
8QUE] (listing the Chicago CPAC as model legislation for democratic policing).
155. Cf Ofer, supra note 16, at 1047-50 (arguing that most civilian review boards have some
limited ability of a police chief to review a disciplinary decision, but that the default should be that the
discipline sticks).
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urban planning decisions. 156 Racial justice movements like the Movement for
Black Lives have helped highlight the intersection of policing and mass
incarceration on the one hand and the financial pressures faced by local
governments struggling under austerity budgets on the other. Indeed, the city of
Ferguson, Missouri, one of the central flashpoints in the recent movements
against police brutality, also represents the historical and structural challenges of
inequitable urban development: lack of funding has made the city dependent on
policing and fines as a source of revenue, while larger patterns of zoning and
urban planning have concentrated poverty and recreated racial segregation
57
within Ferguson in relation to the larger St. Louis metro region.'
These urban economic policy issues--efforts to secure capital investment,
zoning and planning decisions around housing and neighborhood revitalization,
and more-remain central to battles old and new between cities, communities,
and capital. 158 Decisions over zoning, land use, development, investment, transit
structures, and even streetscapes can reproduce and entrench racial and economic
segregation and lower economic opportunity and mobility. 159 Any attempt to
tackle structural economic inequality in the city, then, will have to address these
structures that concentrate wealth and deepen exclusion. Furthermore, localities
themselves constitute potentially fruitful spaces for social movement organizing

156. See generally Barbara L. Bezdek, Citizen Engagement in the Shrinking City: Toward
Development Justice in an Era of Growing Inequality, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3 (2013)
(examining approaches to increasing citizen engagement in local government decision-making).
157. See, e.g., Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1021-24 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (class
action alleging racially discriminatory treatment in the form of repeated jailings for unpaid fines); CIVIL
RIGHTS Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 102

(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police departmentreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PS2TNTUR] (identifying that Ferguson has capacity to reform its approach to law enforcement); Richard
Rothstein, The Making of Ferguson: Public Policies at the Root of Its Troubles, ECON. POL'Y INST.
(Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.epi.org/publication/making-ferguson [https://perma.cc/6B72-JRZL]
(arguing that contemporary segregation in a community like Ferguson stems from government policies
and not private prejudice alone); see also Monica C. Bell, Hidden Laws of the Time ofFerguson, 132
HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 16-18 (2018) (analyzing the need for race-centered ideas and approaches rather
than race-neutral or even race-conscious ones); Christopher J. Tyson, From Fergusonto Flint: In Search
ofan AntisubordinationPrinciplefor Local Government Law, 34 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST.
1, 2 (2018) (describing how both Ferguson and Flint "model the racial dimensions of local government
failure"); Angela Harris, Law and Neoliberalismin Keilee Fant v. City of Ferguson, Missouri, LAW &
POL. ECON. BLOG (May 9, 2018) https:/ilpeblog.org/2018/05/09law-and-neoliberalism-in-keilee-fantv-city-of-ferguson-missouri [https://perma.cc/PC6D-N8A7] (critiquing how neoliberal policies end up
punishing the poor through the criminal justice system).
158. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: How STATES STIFLE
URBAN INNOVATION 60-74 (photo. Reprt. 2013) (2008); SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 20;
Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital,Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 123
HARV. L. REV. 482 (2009) (describing municipal efforts to reassert control over business investment
and local economic development decisions).
159. See generally Schindler, supranote 80; ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW, supra note 62.
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and for experimentation with more collective and democratic forms of decision1 60
making.
Battles for community control over urban development have long
represented a central fault line for economic justice movements, pitting them
against both City Hall and private developers. 161 The grassroots activists in the
War on Poverty, for example, sought a radical transformative vision that
prioritized both policy goals (seeking vastly increased federal investments in
poverty-stricken neighborhoods) and power goals (leveraging statutory
opportunities to establish community-based governance bodies to challenge
traditional power structures and local officials). 162 As Tara Melish has argued,
these efforts to transform urban economic development-and more broadly, the
distribution of political power over those policy decisions-fell short precisely
because of how threatening the move to community control felt to existing city
and federal officials who, while convinced of the need to alleviate urban poverty,
63
nevertheless presumed to maintain their monopoly on political control. 1 As a
result, commentators both at the time frequently viewed and today often view
the War on Poverty as a failure. 164 But that failure stems in large part from the
deliberate retreat from more radical visions of grassroots, community assertions
of control over city planning, zoning, and investment decisions.
Since then, clashes over urban economic policy have taken a different form,
experimenting with more tentative models of community participation. The
clashes of the War on Poverty helped fuel a subsequent wave of community

160. See, e.g., Sheila R. Foster & Christian laione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 281,290 (2016) (describing the city as "an enabler and facilitator of collaborative decision making
structure(s)"); Davidson, supra note 22, at 574 (suggesting that local administration might "serve less
as a repository of technical expertise and more as a mediating body to channel local input and
knowledge"); id. at 609 (suggesting that the informality of local administration can create opportunities
for participation and also for private capture).
See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Steven A. Boutcher, Mobilizing Local GovernmentLaw for
161.
Low-wage Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 187, 187-91 (2009).
162. For several recent analyses of the positive political effects of the War on Poverty and their
implications for today, see, for example, NOEL A. CAZENAVE, IMPOSSIBLE DEMOCRACY: THE
UNLIKELY SUCCESS OF THE WAR ON POVERTY COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAMS (2007); THE WAR
ON POVERTY (Annelise Orleck & Lisa Gayle Hazirjian eds., 2011); and Tara J. Melish, Maximum
t
FeasibleParticipationof the Poor: New Governance, New Accountability, and a 21 Century War on
the Sources ofPoverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 1 (2010).
163. See Melish, supra note 162, at 28; cf Wendy A. Bach, Mobilization and Poverty Law:
Searchingfor ParticipatoryDemocracyamid the Ashes of the War on Poverty, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y &
L. 96, 136 (2012) (arguing that there were some intermittent successes during the War on Poverty with
"administrators who were flexible as to means but committed to, or at least willing to be pulled toward,
robust forms of participation and effective advocacy by poor communities").
164. See Melish, supranote 162, at 26-27 (documenting the ways in which both commentators
at the time considered and historians today consider the War on Poverty to have been ineffectual); see
also Bach, supra note 163, at 128 ("[T]he vast majority of scholars studying Community Action at the
time concluded that the involvement of representatives in poor communities in the administration and
governance of local Community Action Agencies (CAAs) [did not provide] a meaningful platform for
community based groups to wield significant power....").
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economic development movements that sought a less confrontational approach,
emphasizing collaboration with banks, investors, and city officials. This
community economic development movement of the 1980s and 1990s led to the
flourishing of a wide range of community-based non-profit organizations,
encompassing housing and lending cooperatives to neighborhood development
funds and more. 165 But in comparison to the more radical vision of the War on
Poverty era organizers, the extent to which these organizations shifted the
underlying balance of power remains unclear, even as they achieved real gains
for local residents. 166
More recently, economic justice movements have started to experiment
with more radical institutional transformations aimed at shifting power over
urban economic development policy. The Partnership for Working Families, for
example, has led a series of campaigns aimed at promoting economic justice
specifically through policies around key areas of urban planning and urban
policy, from transportation to economic development to city utility governance.
Notably, it framed its recent campaign entirely in terms of power and
governance: the "We Make This City" campaign launched in 2018 explicitly
focuses on shifting from what the organization frames as "corporate-controlled"
167
cities to "community-controlled" ones.
One key site for this attempt to shift power over the control of urban
infrastructure has been the revival of interest in "community benefits
agreements" (CBAs)-contracts that commit developers to particular
benchmarks and mandates, for example, investing in a local park or green space
or committing to hire some fraction of its workers from the local community
where the development is located.16 8 The track record of CBAs has been
decidedly mixed, and some have even been tainted by the presence of groups
purporting to represent the local community but that actually receive funding and
backing by the developers themselves. 169 Wherever a well-organized, effective
community organizing presence capable of holding developers accountable to
the terms of the agreement exists, CBAs have been more successful in hitting
165.

See generally WILLIAM

H.

SIMON,

THE COMMUNITY

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

MOVEMENT (2001) (describing this wave of less confrontational community economic development
movements).
166. For a critique of collaborative governance arrangements as reifying power imbalances in the
context of poverty law and local level policies, see, for example, David A. Super, Laboratories of
Destitution:DemocraticExperimentalism andthe FailureofAntipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541,

565 (2008), as well as Bach, supra note 163, at 155 (discussing how tokenistic representation is unlikely
to lead to power-shifting), and infra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing critiques of new
governance).
167. See We Make This City Campaign,P'SHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, WE MAKE THIS CITY,
http://wemakethiscity.org/the-problem-solution/ [https://perma.cc/VS3P-PRX8].
168. See Edward W. De Barbieri, Do Community Benefits Agreements Benefit Communities?,37
CARDOOzo L. REV. 1773, 1784-87 (2016) (defining CBAs and describing how they work).
169. Id. at 1789-91; see also SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 20, at 155-61 (describing
the mixed results and potential tradeoffs involved in early CBAs).
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their mandates. 170 But even in these settings, CBAs risk being divorced from
larger structural patterns and decisions around urban planning, housing, transit
171
In recent years, however, some urban
investments, and other land-use issues.
justice groups have experimented with novel approaches to CBAs. Crucially,
these strategies focus not just on policy outcomes, but also on shifting
governance and monitoring arrangements themselves.
What is most interesting, and most fraught, in these debates is the ways in
which the relevant stakeholders have struggled over questions of power: Who
exercises control over the governance of these projects and at what scale? These
questions of power and control critically shape the degree to which CBAs do in
fact tackle deeper structural inequities of the modem city. In the following Part
we recount two recent policy battles between urban justice movements, city
officials, and developers: the CBA around the Oakland Army Base, and the
recent debate over community benefits agreements in Detroit. Both episodes
highlight the ways in which urban justice movements have focused on shifting
structural inequality by claiming a greater share of political power over urban
planning decisions. But the contrasts between these cases also highlight the
difficult design decisions that can wildly shift the degree to which these
movements are actually able to institutionalize community power.
1.

Claiming a Share of Community Control: the OaklandArmy Base

The recent redevelopment of the Oakland Army Base illustrates this
approach. Oakland launched a $152 million effort to restore its old army base
into a major shipping and logistics hub. 172 In 2013, the developers entered into a
community benefits agreement and a project labor agreement with the City of
Oakland and a coalition of community organizations, spearheaded by Revive
Oakland, a coalition of faith groups, labor organizations, racial and economic
73
justice organizations, and community members. 1 One of the key players in the
(EBASE), the
coalition is the East Bay Alliance for a Sustainable Economy
74
1
Oakland affiliate of the Partnership for Working Families.
While the army base CBA successfully incorporated significant
commitments to local hiring, the key to this initiative was not just the policy
170. See Virginia Parks & Dorian Warren, The Politics and Practice of Economic Justice:
Community Benefits Agreements as Tactic of the New Accountable Development Movement, 17 J.
COMMUNrrY PRAC. 88, 90 (2009).
See De Barbieri, supra note 168, at 1823-24.
171.
172. This section adapts Rahman's previous work. See Rahman, Policymaking,supra note 8, at
346-48; RAHMAN & HOLLIE RUSSON GILMAN, supranote 40, at 194-200.
173. See EBASE andRevive OaklandWin Big, P'SHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES (June 29, 2012),
http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/article/ebase-and-revive-oakland-win-big; [https://perma.cc/56APXC58]; see also Rahman, Policymaking, supra note 8, at 347 (describing the role of Revive Oakland in
securing the CBA).
174. See About Us, E. BAY ALL. FOR SUSTAINABLE ECON., http://workingeastbay.org/about/
[https://permacc/LBP9-Z94U].
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itself, but rather the broader effort to shift governing power towards grassroots
communities. In particular, the CBA established a participatory enforcement
regime to ensure the meeting of commitments to local hiring. The city chartered
a new oversight body, the Oakland Army Base Jobs Oversight Commission, to
monitor the project-an oversight board comprised of eleven members
appointed by the mayor, 175 removable for cause.1 76 Most importantly, the board
members include representatives from the developers and community
organizations. Five of the members must come from community organizations
and coalition groups specified in the ordinance with an additional two members
from organized labor. Two members are drawn from city officials, and two from
the developer. 177 Crucially, community representatives from the Revive Oakland
coalition more broadly hold seven of the eleven seats combined, giving them the
178
balance of power on the board.
The powers of the Commission are broad. The Commission's charge
includes reviewing the implementation of the CBA, monitoring compliance with
the agreement, and negotiating directly with the developers for remedies of
possible violations. 179 The City itself has committed to enforcing the agreement
as a backstop if such negotiations fall short. 180 Furthermore, the Commission is
charged with issuing reports and findings and is empowered to develop
additional procedures for its monitoring functions.' 8' For grassroots groups
focusing on equitable implementation of urban development projects, this
Commission was also valuable as a forum where community members could air
grievances, especially if developers reneged on local hire or community benefits
investments. 182 As a result, the Commission serves both as a unique focal point
for civic engagement and as a vital point of leverage for community members to
influence the project on an ongoing basis. By 2015, the Port of Oakland reported
that over 60 percent of the new army base workforce had come from neighboring
83
constituencies. 1
This commission structure provides a foothold of oversight power for the
communities themselves. While it retains a focus on policy outcomes-local
hiring, for example-it crucially also experiments with a shift in governing
power by placing community members in positions of actual oversight and
monitoring.

175. See OAKLAND, CAL., ORDINANCE 13140 §§ 1,3 (Nov. 13, 2012) (establishing the Oakland
Army Base Jobs Oversight Commission).
176. Id. §7.
177. Id. § 3.
178. See id.
179. Id. §§ 2(a)-(c).
180. Id. § 2(d).
181. Id. § 5.
182. RAHmAN & HOLLIE RussoN GILMAN, supra note 40, at 198.
183.
Press Release, Port of Oakland, 61% Local Hiring Reached at Port of Oakland's Army Base
Development (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.portofoakland.com/press-releases/press-release-406/
[https://perma.cc/T4Q4-TZHT].
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The Oakland CBA might well become the next wave in this history of
battles over urban development and community benefits. On the one hand, it
represents a productive and collaborative approach to urban development. But
on the other hand, it seeks to claim a real share of political authority-however
incremental and localized.
2.

The Battle Over Detroit'sCommunity Benefit Ordinance

An even more ambitious battle over community benefits in post-bankruptcy
Detroit reflects the shift toward contestatory governance. While projects like the
Oakland Army Base have hooked community participation and community
benefits on specific (albeit massive) development projects, the debate in Detroit
was over a citywide community benefits ordinance. Detroit's ordinance would
have codified substantive CBA commitments and a tougher enforcement system
for all major development projects. This shift, from a case-by-case negotiation
over community benefits to a default requirement, represented a major escalation
of CBA ambition. Yet the debate in Detroit also highlights a sharp battle between
urban justice movements and mostly progressive city officials over questions of
power and control.
In November 2016, Detroit approved a first-of-its-kind citywide CBA
ordinance that applies to developments that receive over $1 million of public
1
subsidies (such as tax abatements) and that cost at least $75 million. 8 For such
projects, the City will form a nine-member advisory council comprised of
86
residents. 185 Two of the council members will be neighborhood residents. 1 The
187
council.
the
and
ordinance requires regular meetings between the developer
The developer must report to the city planning department its proposals to
address the neighborhood council's concerns. 188 The ordinance is ambitious and
far reaching: it makes community benefits agreements and the neighborhood
advisory process default, mandatory rules, rather than ad hoc, case-by-case
outcomes that movements must secure through individual targeted campaigns.
This new default rule represents a significant shift in power because it both
imposes substantive obligations on developers and creates a formal process for
neighborhood participation.
While the Detroit ordinance expands on the Oakland model, it also casts
into relief a controversial battle between the visions of progressive city
councilmembers who proposed the ordinance, and organizers' more radical
184. Erick Trickey, The Test JustBeganforthe Community Benefits Movement, NEXT CITY (Feb.
https://nextcity.org/features/view/detroit-test-began-community-benefit-agreements2017),
20,
movement [https://perma.cc/AYK6-LW9G]. For text of the codified ordinance, see DETROIT, MICH.,
CODE ch. 14, art. XII (2019).
185. DETROIT, MICH., CODE ch. 14, art. XII, § 14-12-3(b)(3).
186. Id § 14-12-3(b)(3)(a).
187. Id. § 14-12-3.
188. Id. § 14-12-3(d)(2)(d).
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visions for community control. The ordinance, passed first by the City Council
and then by citywide referendum, competed with an alternative, more aggressive
proposal a coalition of grassroots groups put forth under the "Rise Together
Detroit" campaign. 189 Rise Together's proposal for the ordinance would have
created a much lower trigger for the CBA process-applying the process to all
developments that cost over $15 million and received $300,000 of public
subsidies. 190 The Rise Together proposal contained a very different procedural
mechanism, requiring developers to negotiate directly with a neighborhood
council formed by communities without the involvement of the city
administration. 191 And it would have created a legal cause of action allowing
communities to sue to enforce the terms of the agreement. 192 City officials,
unions, and the chamber of commerce bitterly opposed Rise Together's proposal.
These powerful players viewed the proposal as so onerous that it would inhibit
development and investment that Detroit desperately needed. 193 The Rise
Together proposal was the first to arrive on the political scene; the campaign
secured enough petition signatures to place their proposal up for referendum
first. 194 Only afterwards did the City Council and its coalition hastily engage to
offer their alternative proposal. 195 With the City Council version having passed,
96
the Rise Together coalition is now pushing to toughen the ordinance. 1
As in the case of police reform in Chicago, the clash in Detroit between the
relatively progressive City Council and grassroots movement actors is revealing.
As the scale and ambition of the CBA proposal have increased, so too have the
stakes of the conflicts over the substantive policy design-at what thresholds of
189. See Linda S. Campbell & Daniel Kravetz, In Detroit, the Fightfor Community Benefits
Begins Anew, SHELTERFORCE (Nov. 9, 2017), https://shelterforce.org/2017/11/09/in-detroit-the-fightfor-community-benefits-begins-anew/ [https://perma.cc/9QJZ-DWZD] (describing passage of the 2016
referendum
and
the
debate
around
it);
RISE
TOGETHER
DETROIT CAMPAIGN,
https://www.facebook.com/risetogetherdetroit [https://perma.cc/7E49-KUZW].
190. Read the People's CBO - ProposalA on the November Ballot, DET. PEOPLE'S PLATFORM
(Aug. 19, 2016), http://detroitpeoplesplatfornmorg/2016/08/read-the-peoples-cbo-proposal-a-on-tbenovember-ballot [https://perma.cc/E5MF-Q23M].
191. See id.
192.

See id.

193. See, e.g., Trickey, supranote 184; Christine Ferretti, Prop B Wins, PropA Fails in Detroit
Community
Benefits,
DET.
NEWS
(Nov.
8,
2016),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/11/08/detroit-community-benefitsresults/93507310 /. [https://perma.cc/KJ7Y-F2KH].
194. Kirk Pinho, Benefits OrdinancesDisturb Developers, CRAIN'S DET. BUS. (July 24, 2016),
https://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20160724/NEWS/160729916/community-benefits-ordinancesdisturb-developers [https://perma.cc/S46K-C98A] (describing the community-led Proposal A, the
opposition to it, and the subsequent introduction of the more modest Proposal B offered by elected

officials).
195. Id
196. See Campbell & Kravetz, supra note 189; Violet Ikonomova, Detroit Activists Seek
Changes to 'Toothless' Community Benefits Law, DET. METRO TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2017/11/09/detroit-law-asking-developers-toprovide-community-benefits-amounts-to-lip-service-activists-say [https://perma.cc/382C-G9XA].
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investment and subsidy to set the CBA trigger-and the questions of power and
control. Indeed, further questions remain about the scale and scope of the power
CBAs afford. More recent grassroots advocacy efforts have, for example,
focused on a broader strategy of contesting the influx of big, business-driven,
neighborhood-defining investments even prior to the formation of a CBA. For
example, activists in New York City were central in publicizing and then rolling
back a series of tax breaks and backdoor agreements that Amazon had attempted
to finalize with the City of New York as part of a deal to establish a major
Amazon headquarters in Queens, New York. 197 These fights can be seen as,
among other things, a next iteration of the attempt to create more democratic
forms of contestation and equitable power over big land-use and economicdevelopment-planning decisions.
As each of the cases in this Part highlight, the call for community control
over economic development or policing is merely the first step. The ensuing
questions over institutional design play a large role in shaping the degree to
which these proposals are successful both politically and in shifting power.
11I.
CONCEPTUALIZING POWER-BUILDING IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE

The movement visions of community control over local governance
highlighted in Part II are illustrative of governance processes that establish
greater community control over the day-to-day administration of major urban
systems and services. Movement-designed proposals do not always win the day;
indeed, in both Detroit and Chicago, movement proposals lost out to local bills
backed by city officials already in power. But these nuanced movement visions
are worthy of study. In this Part, we develop a typology of dimensions along
which social movements are envisioning power-building at the local level and
are setting up methods of contesting the distribution of resources. This typology
helps draw out the tradeoffs and design principles that we can glean from the
examples in Part II, and can inform parallel debates about structure, power, and
institutional design in other areas of law and public policy.

197. See, e.g., Press Release, P'ship for Working Families, REACTION TO AMAZON: Local,
National Housing Advocats Release Statement Regarding Amazon's Two-City HQ2 Announcement
(Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.forworkingfamifies.org/article/reaction-amazon-local-national-housing[https://permacc/9U7D-UVKS]
advocates-release-statement-regarding-amazon%E2%80%99s-two
(providing an example of the public posture of one of the key coalition members advancing the fight
against Amazon's proposed developments); Gaby Del Valle, Amazon Won't Be Building HQ2 in New
https://www.vox.com/the2019),
14,
Vox
(Feb.
All,
City
After
York
[https://perma.cc/5N22-ZGWG]
goods/2019/2/14/18225003/amazon-hq2-new-york-pulling-out
(describing the impact of grassroots movements pushing for a shift in the development plan); Amy Plitt,
Amazon HQ2

and NYC: A

Timeline of the Botched Deal, CURBED

(Feb.

18,

2019),

https://ny.curbec~com/2019/2/18/18226681/amazon-hq2-new-york-city-timeline
[https://perma.cc/E4K3-XBNN] (describing the timeline of events from Amazon's proposal to the
deal's collapse).
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Three InstitutionalDesign Dimensions

The examples of visions of community control in Part II reveal the clashes
between social movement actors and policy-makers in their struggles to develop
new institutional forms of democratic control and participation over policing and
urban economic development policy. These competing institutional design
proposals revolve around three distinct design dimensions: (1) the nature of the
authority that the institution grants to impacted populations; (2) the
representativeness of the institution, particularly with respect to disempowered
constituencies; and (3) the moment of the institution's authority, whether it is
situated upstream at an early stage of policy-making, or downstream where much
of the policy in question has already been locked in. These dimensions help
distinguish power-shifting arrangements from more modest proposals. In turn,
they can inform how scholars conceptualize the design of local institutions and
the interaction between political power and legal change.
1.

Nature ofAuthority: Power Versus Input

One of the most striking aspects of the movement-driven visions for local
governance we described in Part II is the way in which these movements seek to
secure power that moves beyond input, and which turns to actual governance:
administration, implementation, enforcement, and monitoring. The input-control
distinction is not an on-off switch, but is rather a continuum ranging from a body
whose recommendations are merely advisory, at one extreme, to a body with
complete, non-reviewable control over policies and decisions that govern local
services, at the other. The movement visions highlighted in Part II are animated
in part by a critique of more conventional approaches to civic engagement that
emphasize input. Even when input is "real"--even when it leads to shifts in
significant policies-input is different than having direct power over the

policies. 198
This input-control distinction plays out most clearly in the example of
policing above: whereas the liberal vision of those in power is a more traditional
idea of civilian review, in which civilian review boards provide nonbinding input
and recommendations to police departments, movement actors instead lift up a
vision of community control, in which local bodies have decisive power to
determine policing policies and impose discipline. 199 It is not a coincidence that
these movement visions suggest control rather than input; the proposals from
movements are bom from intense critiques of past forms of governance, such as
community policing, that fail to shift structural interactions at the local level and
198. Cf Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding,supra note 28, at 1776 (contrasting "the dignity to
participate" with "the dignity to decide" in local and sublocal governance); Shoked, supra note 10, at
1380 ("Micro-localism can only engage residents in participatory politics if real political powers,
pertaining to issues that 'matter,' are delegated to them.").
199. See supra notes 113-133 and accompanying text.
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may even reinscribe existing power imbalances.2 00 For example, the distribution
of policing, or decisions over major development projects, can have outsized
ripple effects on the larger practices, behaviors, and patterns of activity that
construct the modem city. To the extent that movements can secure a role with
power over such day-to-day governance decisions in the administration,
implementation, enforcement, and monitoring of these systems-beyond inputs
into specific policy goals-they can help gradually reshape these background
structures themselves, piecemeal, over time.
This distinction between mere input and actual power parallels a tension
within scholarly debates about democracy, participatory governance, and
institutional design. Indeed, a major strain among scholars of democracy and
participation explains the ideal of bottom-up engagement through an input
framework. Scholars of new governance or democratic experimentalism have,
for example, often pointed to the value of participatory input as a way to improve
20 1
And for
collective decision-making and to make government more effective.
precisely
scholars
for
solution
go-to
a
decades, community policing has been
because of its potential to include disempowered populations in policing through
deliberation and cooperation with police officials. 20 2 Similarly, recent interest in
theories of epistemic democracy emphasize the informational benefits of such
participation. 20 3 But while these literatures exhibit a deep interest in
participation, others have rightly critiqued these approaches for falling short in
actually shifting the balance of power. Thus, scholars have highlighted the limits

200. See Simonson, Democratizing CriminalJustice,supra note 11, at 1615-16 (describing the
movement critique of Chicago of Rahm Emanuel's community-policing initiative).
See, e.g., CRISTrE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE 85-100 (2017) (outlining major
201.
scholarly frameworks around responsive regulation, new governance, and other similar approaches);
Doff & Sabel, supra note 29 at 283-89 (outlining how novel forms of local participation can help
citizens hold institutions to account); William H. Simon, The InstitutionalConfiguration of Deweyan
Democracy, 9 CONTEMP. PRAGMATISM 5, at 15-30 (describing principles of collaborative governance)
(2012); Gniinne de Bfirca, New Governance andExperimentalism:An Introduction,2010 WIS. L. REV.
227, 227-32 (discussing background conditions for new governance); Charles F. Sabel & William H.
Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 78-89 (2011)
(arguing for a shift towards regulatory and administrative designs that prioritize experimentalism,
adaptability, and collaborative governance).
202. See, e.g., Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered Deliberation in
Chicago Schools andPolicing,29 POL. & SoC'y 73,73-80 (2001) (discussing how community policing
in Chicago exemplifies "Empowered Deliberative Democracy"); Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and
InstitutionalDesign, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183, 204-08 (2003) (citing JORGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY
(William Rehg trans., 1996)) (discussing how police departments can use the ideas of deliberative
democracy and procedural justice to increase citizen participation); see also SKLANSKY, supra note 19,
at 114-20 (describing and critiquing the ascendance of community policing); Simonson, Copwatching,
supra note 11, at 392-95 (describing the scholarly and popular focus on consensus and deliberation in
community policing).
See generally COLLECTIVE WISDOM (H1ne Landemore & Jon Elster eds., 2012)
203.
(recounting current state of scholarship on epistemic democracy).
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of new governance approaches to stakeholder consultation 204 and have critiqued
the consensus-based focus of community policing. 205 Similarly, studies have
highlighted how outsized influence and sophistication of more well-resourced
interests can skew even empowered engagement processes.

20 6

Scholars working in the new governance vein are not blind to the need to
proactively facilitate stakeholder engagement, particularly among less powerful
groups.20 7 But in the end, the ability of groups to participate-and the likelihood
that such participation actually shifts policy outcomes and power disparitiesdepends critically on how much power is actually at stake in the first place. As
Jerry Frug wrote in his seminal law review article on the subject, "Power and
participation are inextricably linked: a sense of powerlessness tends to produce
apathy rather than participation, while the existence of power encourages those
able to participate in its exercise to do so." 208 Movement visions of power beyond
input suggest that for such participatory institutions to generate real power, they
may need to focus less on mere information-gathering or consensus, and more
204. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, When New GovernanceFails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323,362 (2009)
("[P]articipatory structures may rhetorically include disempowered stakeholders but actually cede little
or no power."); Jaime Alison Lee, "Can You HearMe Now? ": Making ParticipatoryGovernance Work
for the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 405, 413-17 (2013) (describing the problem of "cosmetic

participation" in New Governance initiatives when those who participate lack power over the results of
decisions). Financial regulation again is a compelling example of this danger. See, e.g., Cristie Ford,
New Governance in the Teeth ofHuman Frailty:Lessons from FinancialRegulation, 2010 Wis. L. REV.
441, 476 (noting how agency consultations with industry as a form of civic engagement resulted in
outsized influence for financial firms).
205. See, e.g., STEVE HERBERT, CITIZENS, COPS, AND POWER: RECOGNiZING THE LIMITS OF
COMMuNITY 55-59 (2006) (describing how in Seattle's community policing program, the same three
to five people "represent[ed]" the "community" in community meetings); SKLANSKY, supra note 19, at
114-20 (critiquing the practice of community policing); James Forman, Jr., Community Policingand
Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 14-16, 19-22 (2004) (describing and collecting
studies of the uneven inclusion of populations with little political power in community policing,
especially poor people of color and young people); Simonson, Copwatching,supranote 11, at 398-407
(detailing the shortcomings of consensus-based community policing).
206. See, e.g., SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 20, at 155-61 (discussing the possibility of
co-optation by private capital in the context of CBAs); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A
Bias Towards Business?Assessing Interest Group Influence on the US. Bureaucracy,68 J. POL. 128,
1-35 (2006) (noting the greater influence by business lobbies in notice-and-comment procedures).
Financial reform offers a particularly powerful example of this failure. See Brian Libgober & Daniel
Carpenter, Lobbying with Lawyers: Financial Market Evidence for Banks' Influence on Rulemaking
(Jan.
9,
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://equitablegrowth.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/01162018-WP-lobbying-w-lawyersl .pdf [https://perma.cc/QYN2-QRGZ]
(empirically documenting how rule-makers quoted financial firms with more influential comments in
financial regulation notice-and-comment procedures, which correlates with billions of dollars of
increased financial returns compared to other actors whose comments rule-makers did not quote). See
generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don't "ScrewJoe the Plummer": The Sausage-making of Financial
Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2013) (documenting how financial regulation notice-and-comment
procedures are dominated by financial firms).
207. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 201, at 82 (describing how design of stakeholder
consultation processes in new governance approaches can help facilitate greater engagement and more
effective participation).
208. GeraldE. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1057,1070(1980).
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on engaging and structuring productive forms of contestation, where there is real
20 9
power at stake.
2.

Composition andRepresentation

As the discussion of power and input suggests, the degree to which new
institutions for decision-making actually shift control to traditionally
disempowered groups depends, in part, on the design and structure of the
institution and its processes. A second key feature of the design of participatory
institutions is the representativeness of the bodies proposed by movement actors,
whether in the policing context or in the urban development context. Of central
importance to social movement actors is whether there is representation of
traditionally powerless groups affected by the policies in question. This
dimension requires an analysis of who "the people" are who are invited to
2 10
Movement actors center this
participate in these modes of governance.
themselves comprised of
are
question because many social movements
individuals from groups who have been historically disempowered, and who
211
seek to build collective power as a means of social change.
The fight over the makeup of the civilian police review board in Oakland,
for instance, illustrates the types of struggles at stake. There, the debate centers
on whether to appoint individuals who have had contact with the criminal legal
system to the new police review board. In Oakland, movement actors seek not
just to allow people with criminal records to serve on the board, but to prioritize
them. Movement actors seek to focus on people with criminal records as the very
people who, because of their experiences with policing, are most likely to shift
long-cemented, problematic understandings of how policing happens. In
contrast, institutional actors have countered by demanding "relevant
experience," a term that excludes the very individuals who have been hampered

209.

Cf MCCORMICK, supra note 60 (describing institutional designs built to facilitate

contestation between social classes as beneficial for both democratic participation and checks on state
and elite power); Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 22, at 7-8 (describing the
importance of shifting power to minorities via local and sublocal governance decisions); Jane
Mansbridge et al., The Place of Self-interest and the Role of Power in DeliberativeDemocracy, 18 J.

POL. PIL. 64, 93 (2010) (calling to embed nondeliberative forms of negotiation in deliberation).
210. Cf Forman, supra note 205, at 2 (arguing that youth should be included in community
policing); Joanna C. Schwartz, Who CanPolice the Police?,2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437,463 (describing

how, for civilian review institutions, the "motivations, resources, and leverage depend to a significant
extent on the manner in which these entities are created and staffed"); Simonson, The Place of "the
People," supra note 11, at 252-57 (critiquing exclusionary conceptions of "the people" in the criminal
legal system).
211.

See Charles Tilly, From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements, in HOW SOCIAL

MOVEMENTS MATTER 253, 257 (Marco Giugni et al. eds., 1999) (defining a social movement as "a
sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those
power holders by means of repeated public displays of that population's worthiness, unity, numbers, and
commitment").
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from achieving experience by the structures at hand: the distribution of policing
and the interaction between criminal records, employment, and race.2" 2
The debate in Oakland brings up a key conflict that animates any effort at
representation: how to achieve representation on local bodies by those who have
been systematically excluded from political participation. This concern is
especially pointed in the context of policing, for it is policies about criminal law
and procedure that create the very power disparities themselves. Those who
already have power select patterns of policing, prosecution, and punishment that
play a direct role in disenfranchising people of color, destabilizing
neighborhoods, disrupting families, and otherwise undermining political
participation among marginalized populations.21 3 In this way, the criminal legal
system is not just undemocratic, it is antidemocratic. 214 The antidemocratic
nature of legal systems is not limited to criminal law, making issues of
representation in the face of long-standing political oppression relevant to any
number of government functions.
A related concern over composition and representation arises in the debates
over CBAs and the neighborhood advisory bodies: if those already in power
select community representatives, those representatives might not be truly
independent from those who already hold power. Revive Oakland, for example,
was careful to construct the composition of the advisory body to include
representatives from different stakeholder groups, with a particular focus on
affected but traditionally disempowered constituencies. The city ordinance
codified a representative structure that included developer and city
representatives as well. In Detroit, Rise Together was concerned with the final
ordinance because the City's role in hand-picking representatives could lead to
a watered-down advisory board.
The point here is not that there is an abstract ideal structure to representative
bodies, but rather that design choices and the individual leaders involved can
play a large role in making bodies more or less powerful. A first set of design
choices question how representatives are selected, who they are selected by, and
212.

See generally Devah Pager, The "Stickiness " of Race in an Era ofMass Incarceration,in

BEYOND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL INEQUALITY IN A POSTRACIST ERA 257 (Fredrick C. Harris &

Robert C. Lieberman eds., 2013).
213. See Jeffrey Fagan et at, supra note 82, at 1554 (describing the "social, economic, legal, and
political mechanisms through which spatial concentration transforms a spike in incarceration from an
acute external shock into an enduring internal feature of the neighborhood fabric").
214. See generally AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE
DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 58-195 (2014) (describing how

contact with the criminal justice system disenfranchises and alienates people from political systems);
Bell, supranote 63, at 2067 ("[A]t both an interactional and structural level, current regimes can operate
to effectively banish whole communities from the body politic."); Janet Moore, Isonomy, Austerity, and
the Right to Choose Counsel, 51 IND. L. REV. 167, 176-79 (2018) (detailing "the antidemocratic impacts
of the carceral state"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructinga CriminalJusticeSystem Free ofRacialBias:
An AbolitionistFramework,39 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261,279-86 (2007) (describing the criminal
justice system's "antidemocratic impact").
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what qualifications might be required. For example, institutions composed of
self-selected representatives will function differently than those composed by
lottery-selected, elected, or appointed representatives. 2 15 A second set of design
choices question whether, once selected, representatives have autonomy and
independence from city (or neighborhood) leaders: Do they serve on an ad hoc
basis, at the pleasure of an administrator, or with set terms? Asking such
questions can help focus on whether the composition of a local body has the
potential to truly shift political power in the face of structural inequality. 216 A
third set of design questions turns on the interaction between representatives and
their larger constituencies. As theorists of representation have suggested,
representatives are never truly independent of their constituents; rather, they
217
exist in a dynamic relationship between representative and mass movements.
That interaction shapes both the views and actions of the representative and the
ideas, values, and influence of constituencies themselves. 2 18 These questions,
taken together, suggest the importance of focusing on the composition of local
government bodies with respect to historically disempowered populations.
3.

Moment ofAuthority: Upstream Versus Downstream

Community representation and decision-making on local governing bodies
can take place at different points in the policy process. Think of a simple
spectrum characterizing a policy-making process. Some decision points take
place upstream, early in a policy-making discussion when many possibilities are
live. Such upstream decisions are thus also likely to be more structural, as more
is up for grabs. Other decision points take place downstream, where there are
still possible changes, but prior decisions have already locked much more in
place. The moment when participation and community control take place thus
plays a large role in defming the degree of power that an institution affords to a
given constituency. Upstream decisions have larger ripple effects and thus can
address a wider range of structures and issues. Downstream interventions are
more discrete, with fewer impacts on the ground. And, of course, the length of
the stream is itself structured by the interactions between local boundaries and
state and federal laws.
For example, the Detroit CBA represents a more radical shift in power
dynamics over traditional processes of urban development because it moves
further upstream than prior ad hoc, project-based CBAs; it creates a new default
rule affecting all developments throughout the city. Economic and racial justice

215. See Fung, supranote 35, at 67-68.
216.
Cf Gerken, Second-OrderDiversity, supra note 28, at 1177-82 (describing the values and
risks of shifting power over local decision-making to political minorities).
217. See, e.g., Lisa Disch, Towarda Mobilization Conception of DemocraticRepresentation, 105
AM. POL. SCI. REv. 100, 100-03 (2011).
218. See id.
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claims might have even greater force when operating at the level of upstream
city zoning decisions or at the scale of the metro region, rather than at the
neighborhood or community board level. Indeed, many experiments in
participatory urban planning have been hyperlocal, focused on a very small
community and a relatively downstream set of decision points. 2 19 Confining
participation to hyperlocal institutions in such a way not only undermines the
scope of power exercised by communities in these processes, but also increases
the potential pathologies of an overly fragmented and localized form of
participation. 220 Here, too, movement actors raise institutional design choices
that parallel tensions within participatory-governance scholarship. While many
scholars of participatory governance have highlighted the value of small-scale
"mini-publics," where participation can take place over more concrete issues
through small-group deliberations, 22 1 other scholars have warned that such
governance may not operate at a sufficiently high scale to generate meaningful
power.

22 2

A related variation on the upstream-downstream distinction is a contrast
between policies that operate ex ante and those that operate ex post. Policing
provides a useful example here: while traditional civilian review boards focus
exclusively on reviewing the performance of individual police officers or even
department performance as a whole, movement-driven visions for civilian
control boards focus more explicitly on ex ante policy-making. 223 Control boards
allocate or reduce funding for police department weapons, while review boards
decide whether to discipline an individual officer after they have allegedly used
a weapon with excessive force. Key words such as "oversight" and "review"
often imply this latter sort of downstream review of performance of individual
government actors. In contrast, an ex ante influence over policy directives
themselves-for example, deciding how many police officers should be
dispatched to a given neighborhood, or whether police officers should even be
allowed to carry guns-may give bottom-up governance the potential to
intervene more deeply in the structural dispersal of policing resources, and in the

219. See Shoked, supra note 10, at 1380 (discussing microlocal institutions).
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Robert E. Goodin & John S. Dryzek, DeliberativeImpacts: The Macro-political
Uptake of Mini-publics, 34 POL. & SoC'Y 219 (2006).
222. See generally Ford, supra note 25 (describing the racialized history of boundary-drawing in
local government law, which calls into question the benefits of change at the local level); Archon Fung,
Puttingthe PublicBack into Governance: The Challenges of Citizen Participationand Its Future, 75
PuB. ADMIN. REv. 513, 521 (2015) ("There are many different ways to restrict participation so that, at
the limit, it is trivial: participants exercise little influence over outcomes, the agenda of issues that they
consider can be highly constrained, or the resources and authorities invested in a participatory process

can be tiny.").
223. For more on the importance of distinguishing between ex ante and ex post democratic
participation in policing, see Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 112, at 1831-35.
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distribution of violence at the neighborhood level. 224 Ex ante influence may also
facilitate broader contestation of dominant ideas about the purpose and benefits
of services such as policing in the first place. For example, a question about
funding for weapons requires discussing the relationship of police violence to
the geographical distribution of money and power, while a question of individual
discipline of a police officer does not. The distinction between ex ante and ex
post may therefore sometimes-though not always-mean a distinction between
wholesale or retail power, between decision-making that affects an entire
sublocal system or one that merely affects individual projects or people, and
between affirming or contesting dominant conceptions of the meanings and
purposes of local government institutions themselves. The retail level is not
necessarily less powerful, but it tends to be.
B.

Three-DimensionalThinking About Power and Local Governance

These three dimensions-the nature of authority, the composition of
authority, and the moment of authority-are all related but distinct. Each
dimension demarcates a spectrum along which power over structure can be
loosely measured. Taken to one extreme, the result is a weak form of community
involvement: only providing input, so late in a process that it affects relatively
little, through a body that does not prioritize participation by the historically
disempowered. At the other extreme, these three dimensions together sketch a
contrastingly powerful model of community control: exercising real power,
significantly upstream to affect a wide range of policy decisions, through a
representative body independent of those already in power. In practice, these
dimensions are likely to interact in different ways, opening up a variety of design
choices and strategies. Thus, some interventions might institutionalize stronger
forms of power that go beyond mere input, but do so at points that are relatively
downstream in a policy-making process, and therefore exercise more bounded
authority on policy decisions. By contrast, other interventions might involve
conventionally weak forms of participation-such as ex post monitoring-but
might provide a level of power and authority that makes them highly influential.
These three dimensions provide a way to read the comparisons between
different visions of institutional reform. For example, in the economic
development context that we describe in Part I.B, the Revive Oakland campaign
successfully created a representative body with real community power, but
focused on a very domain-specific context of the Army Base redevelopment. As
big as the army base project is, it does not encompass the entirety of land-use
and urban-planning crises facing Oakland in this period of rapid gentrification
and widening inequality. And while the community role in monitoring
224. Cf Tracey L. Meares, ProgrammingErrors: Understandingthe ConstitutionalityofStopand-Friskas a Program,Not an Incident, 82 U. CHi. L. REv. 159, 160-61 (2015) (describing New York
City's "stop-and-frisk" policy, an example of how much everyday policing operates on a systemic
programmatic level rather than at the level of individual-officer decisions).
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compliance with the CBA represents a significant shift in power relationships
around urban development projects, it falls short of radical aspirations for
community control of the local economy. The Detroit CBA, by contrast, sought
to secure a wider citywide scope--operating upstream, along dimension three.
But in the end, it faced its own tradeoffs, gaining wider scope and reach, but
reducing the grassroots calls for more robust power. It settled for more of an
advisory input form of authority--operating toward the input side of the
spectrum, along dimension one. This tradeoff is in a sense understandable:
Detroit remains at the mercy of developers whose investment it hopes to secure
in the quest to rebuild the city after its catastrophic collapse. But the Rise
Together proposal also faced some design challenges of its own. By cutting the
city administration out of the neighborhood-council process, the Rise Together
proposal sought to avoid a potential danger of developer-city capture that might
dilute community control. And newer fights around major economic
development projects, like the Amazon headquarters debate, represent further
attempts at establishing community control even more upstream, targeting the
prior negotiations between companies and the city even before a CBA is entered
into. These newer fights seek to claim community influence that is more
upstream, but so far lack the kinds of institutionalized structures that would
entrench greater community power and representation.
These three dimensions thus provide a way to analyze institutional reform
proposals. Table 1 below summarizes the different proposals described in Part II
along these different dimensions.
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Table 1: Three Dimensions of Authority
Dimension Three:
Dimension Two:
Dimension One:
Composition and Moment of
Nature of
Authority:
Representation
Authority: Power
of Disempowered Upstream vs
vs Input
Downstream
Populations
Community Control of the Police

Chicago CPAC
(losing
movementdriven proposal)

Strong: power to
adopt rules for
police conduct

Strong: mandated
independence
from police and
city leaders

Strong: power over
both ex ante police
policy and ex post
police discipline,
suggests more
structural, farreaching influence

Medium: main focus
is on ex post
discipline, but some
focus on broader
pattems of
misconduct
Weak: Main focus is
mandated
Strong:
largely
Medium:
Oakland
representation and on ex post police
investigatory body
Community
encouragement of discipline in
Police Review
individual cases; little
justice-involved
Agency
influence on broader
residents
policies or patterns
Community Control of Local Economic Development
Strong: more
Strong: more
Strong: mandatory
Detroit CBA
upstream and
representative
community benefits
Ordinance
structural focus on
body
requirements
(losing
citywide
movementdevelopment process
driven proposal
from Rise
Together)
Strong: more
Medium:
Weak: less power,
Detroit CBA
upstream and
potentially
more input
Ordinance (as
structural focus on
representative
enacted by City
citywide
but
body,
Council)
development process
concerns that it
may not be
Medium: relatively
Strong:
Revive Oakland Medium: some
limited focus on a
degree of real power representative
(as enacted by
single development
advisory body
through monitoring
City Council,
project of the Army
of CBA
with movement
Base; but that project
support)
is itself massive and
hugely important in
Oakland's economy

Chicago COPA
(winning
Emmanuelbacked proposal)

Weak: investigatory
body;
recommendations
nonbinding

Medium: claims
independence, but
no safeguards in
the ordinance
itself

and politics
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Comparing the different institutional reform proposals from Part II along
these three dimensions reveals a series of insights that can help shape thinking
around institutional design at the local level. First, note how movement-driven
visions of institutional reform are more radical along all three dimensions than
the official versions enacted by city governments: in the policing reform fight, it
is the losing CPAC proposal in Chicago that is strong in all three dimensions,
and in the CBA debate, it is the Rise Together movement's proposal that is strong
in all three dimensions. Although neither of these radically powerful proposals
won the day, the winning proposals contain very real experiments with powershifting institutional designs in some official city policies. For instance, the
Revive Oakland campaign has a strong representative body. It makes strides in
seeking power over input and in moving relatively upstream in the development
process.
Table 1 also demonstrates how the different dimensions interact and offset
one another. An institutional proposal that might be weak on one dimension can
compensate by shifting more power on another dimension. Thus, the Detroit
CBA as enacted, with an advisory role for a potentially unrepresentative body,
is weak along Dimension One. But, it does exercise more structural power
through its upstream citywide reach. As suggested in Part II above, these hybrid
proposals that are weak in some respects and strong in others might well be more
likely outcomes of politically contested reform debates. City officials may be
willing to countenance more far-reaching forms of structural influence if the
form of input is more advisory. Similarly, there may be more willingness to
allocate greater power to representative bodies if their scope of influence is
limited to specific cases rather than larger policies or patterns.
Furthermore, while these three dimensions of power-shifting in
institutional design are conceptually independent, they are often politically
linked. These three dimensions taken together suggest that genuine powerbuilding, as conceived at the social movement level, may require a real shift in
decision-making authority and a shift in who is capable of deciding, halting, or
shaping policy outcomes. Such participation departs from more conventional
accounts of civic engagement, participation, or collaborative governance. But
the specter of such community power-power that goes beyond mere input-is
often terrifying to policy-makers and proponents of expert-driven "good
governance." And perhaps institutional actors should be terrified at the potential
for contestation over larger ideas of what local government should be: calls for
community control of the police in Chicago, for example, often go hand in hand
with a call to disarm, defund, or even abolish the police department itself.225 If

225. In 2019, for example, activists joined together in a coalition that is backing the new CPAC
bill and simultaneously calling for the defunding and disarming of the police. See @BLMChi, TWTER
(June
12,
2019,
11:25
AM),
https://twitter.com/BLMChi/status/1 138875087577387009
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democracy is to have real meaning, it should be messy and conflictual,
decisions. 22 6
facilitating contestation over important and therefore controversial
Moreover, the forms of change necessary to shift and undermine longstanding
structural inequalities will necessarily destabilize the status quo. Politically,
though, this means that efforts to institutionalize more robust forms of power are
likely to generate more opposition--even from otherwise favorably inclined
public officials.
All that said, a few caveats are in order. First, these dimensions do not
227
The literature on
exhaust the terrain of institutional design choices.
institutional design is vast, and there are many further decisions to be made, for
example, about how exactly to set up representative bodies, or whether to
increase participation in a standard-setting phase, or a monitoring-andenforcement-phase. 2 28 And of course these design choices do not exhaust the
wide range of institutional design considerations that will be familiar to public
law scholars in the context of debates over constitutional structure,
229
Second, this discussion is not meant to
administrative agencies, and the like.
imply that all, or any, forms of community control are productive at the policymaking level. Even in institutions that reflect greater power-shifting along these
three dimensions, reformers still face the challenge of structuring the inner
workings of those new institutions in ways that make such community control
actually effective in changing city services on the ground. Indeed, movement
visions of community control are often flawed, or, in the end, face the danger of
being co-opted by more traditional arrangements that maintain existing power
relationships. 230 Third, and relatedly, this discussion thus far bypasses the many
restraints that states, and to a lesser extent the federal government, impose on the
23 1
Finally, there may be some criticisms
power of local governments themselves.
[https://permacc/Z84Z-SNMQ] ("Defund, Disarm, Disrupt CPD and business as usual. #FIGHTBACK
#CPACNow.")
226. See supra Part L.A (arguing for the centrality of contestation to combatting structural
inequality).
227. See generally VERMEULE, supra note 14 (summarizing how institutional-design choices
advance various democratic goals); Fung, supra note 35 (outlining a framework for understanding major
institutional design variations in contemporary participatory institutions).
228. On the role of participation in monitoring and enforcement in various contexts, see, for
example, Melish, supra note 162 (performance monitoring of social welfare institutions); K Sabeel
Rahman, From Civic Tech to Civic Capacity: The Case of Citizen Audits, 50 POL. SC. & POL. 751
(2017) (describing how enforcement and monitoring can be a mode of participatory power); and
Simonson, Copwatching,supra note 11 (citizen copwatching).
229. See generallysources cited supra note 14.
230. Cf FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY
THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAiL 5 (1977) (arguing that demands for participation from poor people
too often lead to elite-designed institutions that mute oppositional politics).
See generally Edward W. De Barbieri, Urban Anticipatory Governance,46 FLA. ST. U. L.
231.
(2019) (summarizing state-local dynamics in the context of urban planning decisions);
84-86
REV. 75,
Schragger, The PoliticalEconomy of City Power,supra note 22 (summarizing the limitations cities face
in adopting and protecting their own laws). For a recent example of a state government taking away
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that these interventions are not power-shifting enough-for example, one could
imagine, as American city policy-makers have in the past, even more direct
forms of state and democratic control over public infrastructure and decision232
making.
Taken together, though, these movement visions suggest that a genuine
commitment to democratic contestation and bottom-up power-building might
require a radically different approach to institutional and policy design,
emphasizing power, not merely input; ensuring representation; and situating that
power upstream enough to have real impact on the larger structures of
government policy. This approach comes from a recognition that governance is
an ongoing process in which historical inequalities are embedded. "Good
governance," therefore, should value not just efficiency and expertise, but also
justice, inclusion, and democratic legitimacy. The three dimensions of powerbuilding we present do not provide a blueprint for an ideal form of governance.
But they do lead us to a hypothesis: that strong levels of each of the three
dimensions will lead to forms of governance that are the most likely to facilitate
collective contestation and shift power. And, in turn, this hypothesis leads to a
series of empirical questions for which we do not yet have answers. Would a
radical vision of community control lead to policy outcomes better than or
different from those created by other forms of local governance? Would an
institution of community control that is strong along every dimension truly shift
power, or might it still be subject to the same risks of co-optation other
governance arrangements face? Might it devolve into an ugly form of populism?
And would a proposal that is strong on every dimension ever be politically
feasible, even in the most progressive city? Part of what we have attempted to
do by presenting this framework is to put such questions on the table, as a
challenge to study more directly and think more deeply about the potential for
radical shifts in local governance.
IV.
How TO SHIFT-AND STUDY-POWER

Contemporary social justice movements recognize and confront the
problem of disparate power over deep, structural conditions giving rise to
patterns of economic, racial, and gendered inequality and exclusion. As a result,

local power to engage in police oversight, see Natalie Allison, Tennessee RepublicansFileBill Stripping
Nashville Police Oversight Board's Subpoena Powers, TENNESSEAN (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2019/02/04/police-oversight-board-subpoena-powertennessee-house-bill/2773233002/ [https://perma.cc/9QRX-SZB9].
232. See, e.g., Dan Kaufman, Opinion, The City Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez Would Have Loved
to
Live
In,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
19,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/19/opinion/sunday/socialism-milwaukee.html
[https://perma.cc/3ZZL-QGEN] (on Milwaukee's long history of "sewer socialism" as a model for
today's battles with inequality); DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTic CROSSINGS 335-40 (1998)
(describing municipal socialism and the innovation of urban public utilities).
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these movements have begun to pioneer new institutional arrangements aimed at
democratizing control over the policies that shape those deeper structures and
patterns. In Parts II and III we highlighted two of these movement-created
institutional design experiments, in the areas of policing and economic
development. These examples and the typology that emerges from them raise
important questions for scholars and policy-makers focused on questions of
power and institutional design. As we laid out in Part III, there are at least three
distinct dimensions of institutional design choices along which movement actors
move: the nature of authority, the scope of representation, and the moment of
authority. These dimensions in turn may shape the degree to which institutions
actually do or do not shift power over background structural conditions. In this
Part, we outline the implications of our analysis for the study of law, social
change, and legal institutions more broadly. In particular, we highlight the ways
in which our framework of institutional design dimensions can be useful in
thinking about law, policy, and institutions across a number of different specific
policy debates, including policing, economic development, algorithmic justice,
and the distribution of public goods, as well as across transsubstantive areas of
legal scholarship such as public law, local government law, and law and social
movements.
A.

Shifting Power in Local Governance

Across the United States, movement actors continue to push for community
control of local services and resources in cities both large 233 and small. 234 The
conversations these demands generate differ from traditional public policy
debates, which are understood in terms of their substantive concerns and possible
outcomes: How many units of affordable housing are needed and constructed in
a city; how many improper arrests are there in a year and how can that number
be driven down? The pushes for community control over policing and economic
development have a different focus: the policy-making process itself. These
social movement campaigns are worth paying attention to-not just for their
larger calls for democracy and equality, but also for the nuanced ways in which
they seek democratic power over structural drivers of inequality at the local level.
Movement actors ask: Who governs these policy issues and makes these
decisions on a day-to-day basis, and how can people democratize that control
233. See Bryce Covert, A Nationwide Campaignto Take Back Citiesfrom the Corporationsthat
Rule Them, INTHESE TIMES (July 3, 2018), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/21253/privatization[https://perma.cc/ZKC9-4J6M]
Amazon-campaign-We-Make-This-City-Working-Famiies
(describing the "We Make This City" campaign, which calls for community control of local governance
in Atlanta, Boston, Denver, Los Angeles, New York, Oakland, Pittsburgh, San Diego, San Jose, and
Seattle).
234.
See, e.g., CITIZENS' NETWORK OF PROT., PROPOSAL FOR AN EVANSTON BOARD OF POLICE
(2018),
TRANSPARENCY
AND
ACCOUNTABILITY,
OVERSIGHT,

https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/e3aa4b e6af3785d5854baca8b44258bd801889.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V46N-VVS6] (calling for a civilian board to serve as a means of oversight,
investigation, and review of civilian complaints against the Evanston, Illinois, police).
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and make it more inclusive? As we detailed in Part II, these institutional design
questions revolve around three key design dimensions: the nature of authority,
the composition and representation of disempowered populations, and the
moment of authority. We now extend this three-dimensional institutional design
framework to a range of debates to help frame further inquiry into the policy
solutions and institutional design choices facing movement actors, policymakers, and scholars alike.
We begin with the first local policy area we explored above: policing.
Although the concept of civilian oversight of policing is reemerging nationwide
in our movement moment, to date few, if any, jurisdictions have taken up
institutions of community control such as those envisioned by movement actors
in Chicago and Oakland and analyzed in Part II.A above. As jurisdictions
continue to look to civilian oversight of policing as a potential fix, 235 attending
to the specifics of institutional design will be necessary to avoid the pitfalls of
past pushes for civilian oversight. 23 6 Indeed, a three-dimensional comparison of
current institutions of civilian review and past movement-driven pushes for
community control does not support the widespread view that civilian review, as
a concept, is ineffectual; to the contrary, it suggests that we have never actually
experimented on the ground with forms of civilian review that truly shift power
over policing to community members. 237 When thinking about any new
institution of civilian review of the police, then, one might use the framework to
analyze whether that institution would truly shift power away from the police
and toward those who have historically been the targets of police violence,
asking specific questions about the scope and nature of the power of the oversight
board, and the representativeness of its members. These questions about power
might even precede questions of effectiveness in the traditional sense, such as
whether police culture can be changed from the outside or whether laypeople
would likely implement police policies that minimize police violence. When
power-shifting is separated out from these traditional measurements of success,
it is easier to analyze and even to measure.
A similar sequence of questions might arise when considering the threedimensional framework in scholarship about criminal law and procedure more
broadly. For there has been a renewed focus in both scholarship and policy in
235.
See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED
POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21 ST

CENTURY POLICING 26 (2015) (recommending civilian oversight institutions and noting "[t]here are
important arguments for having civilian oversight even though we lack strong research evidence that it
works"), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/97X7-9K5S].
236. See Ofer, supra note 16 (detailing how most civilian review boards have little power and
have led to little change).
237. See id. at 1039 (arguing that civilian review boards have failed because they were "rigged
to fail," which has led to a loss in faith in the concept); cf WALKER, supra note 6, at 44-45, 53-54
(criticizing the widespread view that civilian oversight has been ineffectual and arguing that the reality

is more nuanced).
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recent years on ways to "democratize" institutional sites of criminal law and
2 38
As scholars continue
procedure, including policing and criminal adjudication.
to think through the democratization of policing and criminal adjudication, our
framework suggests they should take a cue from social movements and think
beyond conventional mechanisms of democratic inclusion represented by, for
240
239
or notice-and-comment rulemaking.
example, "community justice"
Instead, they should ask whether deeper contestation and more radical
institutional change may be necessary to truly shift the antidemocratic nature of
24 1
And then, from there, they might move to
much criminal law and procedure.
an analysis of whether these forms of deep democratization are indeed
compatible with the specific criminal procedure at issue.
A similar set of questions arise when applying the view from social
movements in the context of local economic development policy and
scholarship. Take the tactic of community benefits agreements, such as those in
Detroit and Oakland discussed in Part II.B. There has been much scholarly
scrutiny of the specific elements of CBAs, especially focused on their potential
2 42
to result in outcomes that are beneficial to communities and developers alike.
And scholars like Vicki Been and Ted De Barbieri have also provided nuanced
analysis of the representativeness and independence of community members in

238.

See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRUIINAL JUSTICE 29-60 (2012)

(describing how the inner workings of today's criminal justice system undermine democratic notions of
oversight, transparency, and governance); Symposium, DemocratizingCriminalJustice, 111 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1367 (2017) (a collection of essays on the theme of democratizing criminal law); Richard A.
Bierschbach, Fragmentationand Democracy in the ConstitutionalLaw ofPunishment, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 1437, 1452 (2017) (outlining reforms that could protect and promote input into policing and
prosecutorial decision-making); Friedman & Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, supra note 112
(advocating for increasing democratic inputs into policing priorities); Andrew E.Taslitz, The Criminal
Republic: DemocraticBreakdown as a Causeof Mass Incarceration,9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133 (2011)
(arguing that democratic and participatory procedures would improve criminal justice policy).
239. See generally SKLANSKY, supranote 19, at 114-32 (describing the limitations of scholarship
focused on community policing and other forms of community justice that center only on consensusbased methods of public participation); Simonson, Copwatching,supranote 11, at 399-407 (describing
how the consensus-based efforts at community justice reinscribe existing power imbalances).
240. For recent pushes to implement notice-and-comment and other mechanisms of traditional
administrative law into the criminal process, see, for example, Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos
Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2012); Friedman & Ponomarenko,
DemocraticPolicing,supra note 112; and Slobogin, supra note 153.
See generally Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice, supra note 11 (making this
241.
argument); cf Roberts, supra note 63 (arguing that American systems of law enforcement are by their
nature antidemocratic, and that democratizing criminal law therefore requires looking beyond increasing
public participation in criminal justice in the conventional sense).
242. See Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or
Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CH.L. REV. 5 (2010); De Barbieri, supra note 168;
see also Christine A. Fazio & Judith Wallace, Legal andPolicy Issues Related to Community Benefits
Agreements, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 543, 557 (2010) (outlining types of CBAs and the policy
and legal issues surrounding them); Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values,
and Legal Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 35, 37 (2008)
(proposing that focusing on accountability and inclusiveness in CBAs will improve their effectiveness).
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CBAs, as well as ways in which the power dynamics of CBAs can potentially
backfire.2 43 But the view from social movement actors suggests there are
additional questions worth asking, especially as the proposed scope of CBAs
continues to expand. It shifts the questions away from those about big-picture
policy outcomes, or inefficiencies of bargaining, to think more specifically about
the nature of the power given to community members, and to whom exactly that
power is given. This view asks questions about who exactly participates as a
representative of the "community," seeking novel institutional designs like the
oversight board in Oakland. It also explores a wider range of possible modes of
participation, looking not just to ex ante participation but also to ex post modes
of participation in monitoring and enforcement. And it suggests some benefits to
larger CBAs that move beyond individual projects, even if the benefits might
result in other forms of inefficiencies. Applying our framework does not
necessarily result in a conclusion that every CBA is a good thing-far from itbut doing so expands the range of institutional design questions beyond an appeal
to "community participation" and a focus on policy outputs and outcomes,
demanding instead attention to questions of power and structural inequality.
While this Article has focused on two distinct areas of policy reformpolicing and local economic development--our three-dimensional framework
for community control and democratic institutional design is also portable to a
range of other issues. Take, for example, recent debates over designing new
democratic institutional mechanisms to govern the world of big data, algorithms,
and online platforms. With the rise of digital platforms for the online public
sphere like Facebook and Google, and the proliferation of big data and
algorithmically-based governance forms like scoring systems 244 and "predictive
policing," 245 a growing set of scholars, reformers, and activists are highlighting
the ways in which these technological systems are themselves creating new
forms of inequality. 246 These problems no doubt involve technical issues that
will require specific remedies to the regulation and operation of algorithms,
platforms, and Big Data systems. But long-term structural solutions to the
problem of technological exclusion and inequality will likely have to involve the

243. See Been, supra note 242; De Barbieri, supra note 168.
244. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Processfor
Automated Predictions,89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014).
245. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, PolicingPredictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV.
1109, 1149-93 (2017).
246.

See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: How HIGH-TECH TOOLS

PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2017) (describing how algorithmic and technological
surveillance tools disproportionately harm the poor and communities of color); CATHY O'NEIL,
WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: How BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS

DEMOCRACY (2016) (describing the rise of algorithm-based forms of governance and highlighting the
problems they pose for accountability and equality).
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247
For example, in 2017, New York City
creation of new governance regimes.
announced the passage of the first algorithmic-transparency ordinance in the
country and the creation of an algorithmic-accountability "taskforce" to generate
governance. 248
community input into the algorithms the City uses in everyday
Three-dimensional thinking about the creation of new institutions of algorithmic
accountability should give us both pause and excitement about announcements
like this. Not all civilian accountability mechanisms are created equal; instead,
we should not applaud the creation of new governance regimes without a careful
analysis along the dimensions we have proposed. Indeed, in the years since New
York City's algorithmic-transparency law was enacted, external reviews have
raised serious concerns about how New York City engaged with affected
communities, and whether the City's policies did in fact address issues of bias
24 9
and surveillance.
Or consider how debates over access to public goods like the water crisis
in Flint have led reformers to imagine new governance arrangements for utilities
that leverage greater community control as a way to assure access and
accountability. 250 The water crisis in Flint is not just a policy failure on the part
of state and local environmental authorities; it is also rooted in an underlying
disparity of political power, as local residents lacked sufficient institutionalized
levers through which they could pressure state and local officials to respond
251
And indeed,
more rapidly and aggressively to the lead poisoning crisis.
participation,
and
power
of
questions
grassroots reform efforts are raising these
seeking institutional reform of the legal structure of emergency management,
2 52
Our framework can
water utility structure, and other design questions.

247.

See, e.g.,

FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY (2015) (describing

how

corporations and powerful actors use data to manipulate society, and arguing for greater forms of
democratic and public oversight of these systems)
248. See N.Y.C. Council 2018/049 (2018); Lauren Kirchner, New York City Moves to Create
Accountability for Algorithms, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/newyork-city-moves-to-create-accountability-for-algorithms) [https://perma.cc/2VYH-SD6V].

249. See Charlie Innis, "Shadow Report" Clashes with City Algorithms Report, KINGS COUNTY
POL. (Dec. 16, 2019) (describing the critique of New York City's public report on algorithmic bias by
third-party review), https://wwwkingscountypolitics.com/shadow-report-clashes-with-city-algorifmsreport/ [https://perma.cc/J3JY-Q83Y]. Compare N.Y.C. AUTOMATED DECISION SYS. TASK FORCE,
(2019),
DECISION SYSTEMS TASK FORCE REPORT
AUTOMATED
NEW YORK CITY

https://wwwl.nyc.gov/asset/adstaskforce/downloads/pdf/ADS-Report-I 11192019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4C47-XFEX] (New York City report), with Al NOW INST., CONFRONTING BLACK
FORCE
BOXES: A SHADOW REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEM TASK
9
2
https://ainowinstitute.org/ads-shadowreport- 01 .html
2019),
ed.,
Richardson
(Rashida
[https://perma.cc/9Q8V-NWUZ] (critiquing the New York City report).
250. See K. Sabeel Rahman, Infrastructural Exclusion and the Fight for the City: Power,
Democracy, and the Case of America's Water Crisis,53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 533,534 (2018).
Id at 543 ("The kinds of infastructural exclusion . . . are not just products of a
251.
misconception of the nature and importance of water; they are the result of existing disparities of power
as well as structural and institutional dynamics shaping the exercise of public and private authority over
the water system.")
252. Id.at 540-45.
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therefore offer useful insights and directions for these fights over power and
participation in the water context.
As with any new institution, the creation of an institution of local
community control will never be a panacea. Indeed, in Part III.B, we alluded to
a number of potential problems with community control institutions, including
the potential for capture by more powerful interests and the legal hurdles local
governments face. Moreover, for movements focused on profound shifts in
power, community control over discrete services will still fall short of the
immense power needed to promote a greater redistribution of resources-to take
the example of the Invest/Divest movement, 253 it is hard to divest from policing
254
and invest in education if you only have control over one of the two systems.
More broadly, local governments themselves may not have power over the
generators of profound structural inequalities, making community control

difficult as a structural fix.255 But community control should not be so easily cast
aside as politically infeasible or unwise without first digging into which levers
of power will be at play, how those levers will be pulled, and by whom.
B. Studying Power in Legal Scholarship

Contemporary legal scholars can play an important role in this renewed
debate about democracy, equality, and governance. For legal scholarship itself
plays a unique role in the world of law and policy, providing a forum for
sharpening a normatively driven set of commitments to the rule of law and
democracy.2 5 6 In addition, legal scholars can and do bring their expertise in
governance and institutional design to discrete policy fights, envisioning how

253. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
254. But it is not impossible; in Los Angeles, for example, Black Lives Matter activists succeeded
in gathering signatures for a referendum to simultaneously bolster the powers of the Civilian Review
Commission and require "community reinvestment" by transferring resources from local jails to
community services. See Jeffrey Cawood, Black Lives Matter Leader's Referendum Qualifiesfor
Presidential Primary
Ballot
in
2020,
DAILY
WIRE
(Sept.
13,
2018),
https://www.dailywire.com/news/35808/black-lives-matter-leaders-referendum-qualifies-jeffi-eycawood [https://perma.cc/7XYF-SZBW]. The measure passed by a "landslide" in March 2020. See Los
Angeles County, California,MeasureR, Civilian Police Oversight Commission and JailPlanInitiative
(March

2020),

BALLOTPEDIA,

https://ballUotpedia.org/LosAngeles-County-California,_Measure-R,-Civilian-Police- Oversight-Co
mmission and JailPlanInitiative_(March 2020) [https://perma.cc/Y2QR-HBKW]; Jeffrey Cawood,
LANDSLIDE: Black Lives MatterLeader's Ballot Measure Wins Big in Los Angeles County, DAILY
WIRE (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.dailywire.com/news/landslide-black-lives-matter-leaders-ballotmeasure-wins-big-in-los-angeles-county [https://perma.cc/QS35-Y9T4].
255. Cf JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN 12-13 (2017) (describing how in
Washington, D.C., reformers in the 1970s wanted to combat local crime through both criminal law and
broader anti-poverty policies, but "American racism narrowed the options available to Black citizens
and elected officials in their fight against crime"); Ford, supra note 25 (describing how intralocal
inequalities and boundaries between local governments can make local change difficult).
256. Cf Robin West, The Contested Value ofNormative Legal Scholarship, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC.
6, 10 (2016) (describing and defending the practice in legal scholarship of taking normative viewpoints).
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different governance arrangements might be set up, and how they might play out.
These governance questions are often most apparent in public law scholarship
debates over issues like constitutional structure, administrative agency design,
and the like. 257 But as this Article suggests, legal scholars engaging in these
debates should also take a closer look at the more radically democratic
alternative institutional designs being proposed by movement actors, looking for
expertise on the ground and joining with movements to create frameworks for
and theories of legal change. Moreover, even if movement actors may debate and
generate institutional design frameworks that mirror those discussed in existing
public law scholarship, their on-the-ground efforts to contest day-to-day
questions of politics and power are themselves worthy of study and attention
when scholars take up these questions.
It is not that the idea of "community control" itself presents a new set of
concerns or aspirations for reform movements or scholars-the question of
democratic community control has long been an aspiration in democratic theory
and among more radical reform movements. Indeed, there have been remarkable
moments of rich scholarly and reformist exploration over democratic
institutional design and methods for instantiating greater community control,
including in the work of activists and policy-makers during the War on
Poverty, 258 and the burst of scholarship on community control in the 1960s and
2 6°
1970s.2 5 9 More recently, scholarship in local government law, law and social
6
2
2
has made the powerful case for
movements, 261 and participatory governance
exploring greater possibilities of democratic governance. But we can and should
dig deeper. In particular, our call for legal scholarship to invest more time in
imagining democratic institutional-governance arrangements has implications in
particular for three growing, transsubstantive areas of legal scholarship: power
in public law, local government law, and law and social movements.

257.
258.

See generallysupra note 14 and accompanying text
See, e.g., supra note 162 and accompanying text.

259.

See, e.g., ALTSHULER, supra note 91; SCHOOLS AGAINST CHILDREN: THE CASE FOR

COMMUNITY CONTROL (Annette T. Rubinstein ed., 1970); Hatton, supranote 91.
260. See, e.g., FRUG & BARRON, CrrY BOUND, supra note 158 (calling for a new structure in
state-local relations to improve city governance); GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING (1999) (considering
how law and policy has empowered and disempowered American cities); SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER,
supra note 20 (analyzing the governing power of American cities); Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding,
supra note 28, at 1748-49 (observing that a city's decision, resulting in action, may be considered a
dissenting, minority view within the polity as a whole).
261. See, e.g., STONES OF HOPE, supra note 31 (focusing on social and economic rights activism
in Africa).
262.

See HOLLIE RUSSON GILMAN, DEMOCRACY REINVENTED: PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING

AND CivIC INNOvATION IN AMERICA (2016) (explaining how participatory budgeting combined with
technology can be a means to engaging citizens in democratic policy-making); Archon Fung & Erik
Olin Wright, DeepeningDemocracy:Innovations in EmpoweredParticipatoryGovernance, 29 POL. &
SOC'Y 5 (2001) (analyzing examples of "empowered deliberative democracy" and its potential as a
strategy for progressive institutional reform).
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First, in public law scholarship, there has been a recent revival of interest
in power.2 63 This suggests the importance of leveraging plastic administrative
processes2 64 and decentralization 265 to enable social movements and oftendisempowered constituencies to exercise greater political power and community
control. But, this revival has for the most part remained largely theoretical. The
three-dimensional framework provides greater clarity for what a focus on power
in public law institutions might mean, and how power might be better balanced
in governance processes, particularly at the local level. It can give scholars a step
forward, showing them where to look for visions of institutional design and how
to think about power-balancing within local institutions.
Second, our focus on cities builds on and extends the recent revival of
interest in decentralization in general, and local government law in particular.
By putting two seemingly disparate focal points of local governance-policing
and economic development-in conversation with each other, we emerge with
broad principles for institutional design at the city level. There has been a rise in
the celebration of cities as spaces for incubating new policies and as arenas for
democratic politics. 266 Politically, we are in the midst of an urban revival:
progressive cities are rising up as leaders in the fight against inequality, and with
the presidency of Donald Trump, cities are taking center stage as sites of
resistance and contestation. 267 Scholars of local government have noted how this
revival of interest represents a notable shift in the conventional politics of
decentralization: while conventionally localism and decentralization may have
been a common value among conservative political movements and viewed with
skepticism by progressive movements, now the prospects of progressive state

263. See, e.g., Andrias, ConfrontingPower in PublicLaw, supranote 85 (applying a normative
approach to analyzing power in and reform of public law); Levinson, supra note 34, at 38 (calling for
scholars to "make better sense of how power is, and should be, understood, located, and distributed in
public law").
264. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 34 (arguing that scholars should study how power moves
through institutions of public law); Sitaraman, supra note 57 (contemplating its puzzling absence);
Rahman, Policymaking, supra note 8 (advocating for a power-building orientation to designing
administrative processes).
265. See, e.g., Gerken, Dissentingby Deciding,supra note 28 (exploring the importance o and
power in, disaggregated decision-making bodies); Bierschbach, supra note 238 (arguing for a
fiagmented approach to criminal sentencing).
266. See generally Davidson, supra note 22, at 574-79 (outlining the important role of
administrative law in fostering experimentalism and democratic accountability). See also DAVID
HARVEY, REBEL CirIs 25 (2012) ("Urban innovations with respect to environmental sustainability,
cultural incorporation of immigrants, and urban design of public housing spaces are observable around
the world in abundance."); SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 20, at 165-90 (discussing "the ways
in which urban political movements 'shift scales' between local and nonlocal political actors and how
these shifts can provide leverage for the pursuit of progressive policies").
267. See, e.g., TYNAN ET AL., supra note 23 (advocating effective ways for cities to advance
progressive agendas).
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268
Our analysis in this Article
and city governance are more openly celebrated.
is not just in the substantive
city
the
on
focus
this
of
value
the
of
suggests that part
policies cities can innovate and experiment with, but also in the processes and
strategies for power-shifting they can develop. Cities, on our read, are vital in
part as incubators for new democratic practices and strategies.
At the same time, we do not mean to suggest the valorization of local
politics for its own sake. Indeed, we recognize, along with social movement
actors themselves, that local control can be as oppressive as it can be
liberatory.26 9 Moreover, the rise of progressive local policy has unsurprisingly
generated a crackdown as more conservative state and national regulators have
270
reforms.
sought to preempt and limit many states' abilities to pursue these
Indeed, the institutional design lessons coming from experiments in community
control do not have to remain local. As social movements seek to gain control of
broader institutions of political power, we might imagine the same design
questions shaping institutional- and policy-reform questions at the federal, state,
271
Our normative call, then, is not for localism-quaor regional levels.
272
for
a scholarly focus on concrete mechanisms of powerrather
but
localism,
2 73
And in the current
shifting in governance toward the relatively powerless.

268. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption,70 STAN. L. REV. 1995,
1997-98 (2018) (describing efforts in the last decade by Republican state legislatures to block
increasingly progressive local legislative efforts); Davidson, supra note 15 at 963-74 (describing the
"renewed urgency" of localism as national politics become increasingly polarized); Heather K Gerken,
A New Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACY 37 (2012) (describing how historical progressive

unease with decentralization stems from the experience of civil rights movements in the 1960s, and
arguing for the value of empowering constituencies through greater local governance); Heather K

Gerken, DistinguishedScholar in Residence Lecture: A User's Guide to ProgressiveFederalism,45

HOFsTRA L. REv. 1087, 1088 (2017) (describing how progressives can "use their control over blue cities
and states to shape the national agenda").
269. See generally Briffault, supra note 25, at 340-59 (describing the political and structural
variability of local governments); Ford, supra note 25, at 1844 (describing how local governments

facilitated racial segregation).
270. See generally Briffault, supra note 268, at 1999-2008 (describing the rise of recent state
efforts to preempt progressive local legislation and other local policy efforts). See also David J. Barron,
Blue State Federalismat the Crossroads,3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 1 (2009) (describing the successes
of progressive reform at the local level and the threats of state and national preemption arising in
response to these successes). The problem of state and national preemption is, of course, a classic
concern for scholars of local government law. See, e.g., FRUG & BARRON, CITY BOUND, supra note

158, at 68-74 (describing how state governments preempt city government officials' power).
271.

Cf Cashin, supranote 26, at 2033-34 (advocating, in part, for the creation of new regional

institutions that facilitate grassroots engagement-but warning that those new institutions could be coopted by the powerful as much as local institutions can be).
272. Cf SCHRAGGER, supra note 20, at 254 ("Decentralization is not a good in itself; it must be
measured against a set of ends.").
273. To the extent that we are entering the debate over the value of localism in the context of
federalism, we would also endorse a normative frame that places limits on localism to the extent that it
bumps up against values of equality and inclusion. Cf Davidson, supra note 15, at 984-93 (laying out
a normative frame for doing this in the context of judicial review of state preemption).
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political landscape, it is often at the local level that these institutional designs
emerge.
Third, this paper contributes to ongoing questions in the literature on law
and social movements. Scholarship in law and social movements has long
emphasized the importance of movement organizing in building power and
shifting norms, culture, and ultimately, law.2 74 This Article provides another
example of movement actors doing law-making from the ground up, 275 but it
centers on institutional design choices that movement actors are making. Our
approach contributes to a broad sense of the possible strategies and tools through
which social movements can claim greater power and influence-not just
through legal action, or attempts to shift laws and norms, but also through a direct
engagement with, and transformation of, the institutions of ordinary, day-to-day
governance. We are hopeful that it can be a part of the renewed interest in law
and social movement scholarship that elevates on-the-ground expertise from
those most exposed to and impacted by the law's violence. 276 But we also see
this paper as adding an important complement to law and social movement
themes, as the focus here has been not on norm-shifting or organizing, but rather
on the conversion of grassroots mobilization into actual governing power. As
more egalitarian social movements successfully gain a foothold in local (and
perhaps even regional, state, and national) policy-making bodies, it will be
increasingly important for movement actors to shift from a pure advocacy stance
to one that seeks to design and implement a governing agenda, including
institutional reform. 277 This Article provides a preliminary step in fleshing out
that movement-driven exercise of governing power.
CONCLUSION

This Article has looked to the institutional designs generated by local social
movements to put forth a set of three dimensions along which activists, policymakers, and scholars can think about power-shifting and democracy in the realm

274. See, e.g., Akbar, supranote 31; Ashar, supra note 31; Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel,
Principles,Practices,andSocialMovements, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 927,946-48 (2006); Cummings, supra
note 33; Guinier & Torres, supra note 45, at 2757-68; Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matterfor
Social Movements?, in How DOES LAW MATrER? 76, 90-100 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds.,

1998).
275. Cf Matsuda, supra note 30 (issuing a call for scholars to examine law-making at "the
bottom" as a source of liberatory legal interpretation).
276. Cf Akbar, supra note 31 (exploring what it means to think radically about law from a
movement perspective); Ashar, supra note 31 (describing how lawyers engaged with activists and
undocumented youth to create an antienforcement immigration mobilization from 2009 to 2012 as a
form of law-making).
277. Indeed, progressive local officials are increasingly pooling resources and ideas for
institutional change. See, e.g., Steve Early, Diverse,Radical, and Ready to Resist: Meet the First in the
New
Wave of Local Progressive Officials, IN THESE TIMES
(Aug. 8, 2017),
https://inthesetimes.com/article/20412/local-progress-fights-trump-local-elections-resist-laboreducation [https://perma.cc/53RC-TGKB] (describing Local Progress, a national network of progressive
local officials).
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of local institutional design. Taken together, this three-dimensional thinking
about power and contestation in local govemance suggests a way forward for
legal scholars and grassroots social movements to work together in developing
new institutions and public policies that not only address deeper structural
disparities of inequality and power, but also help revive our democratic
institutions. At the very least, for those of us interested in democracy and
equality, these institutional designs are worth our attention, engagement, and
respect.
More broadly, as a cue for future work, we view these institutional design
dimensions as an alternative to a widespread but often hidden problem in legal
scholarship and policy-making alike: the hesitancy to engage with the details of
what it means to "democratize" something. Our hunch is that this hesitancy
expresses an underlying fear of democratic control, rather than a robust
exploration of possible democratizing institutional alternatives. Indeed, the idea
of democratic participation and governance is often too easily dismissed.
Radically participatory democracy, especially, can be often viewed as infeasible,
or as likely to produce bad policy outcomes. And it is harder to quantify the
benefits of power-shifting in a world of data-driven discussion. This Article's
analysis of the three-dimensional thinking about governance by social movement
actors demonstrates that these dismissals are too facile, which in our view
suggests a more pernicious underlying suspicion or distrust of democracy as an
ideal-what we think of as a problem of "demophobia." Demophobia is a fear
of democratic governance, a presumption of democratic failure, inefficiency, and
chaos, and it often can operate behind the scenes, leading scholars, policymakers, and reformers to preemptively avoid an in-depth exploration of how we
might institutionalize and embody effective, contestatory democratic
governance.
This Article, by contrast, has taken a different approach, taking seriously
movement actors' aspirations for radically democratized governance, and
exploring the different institutional design questions that are necessary to make
such democratized governance effective. Pushing back against demophobia
means being willing to dig into those questions with seriousness, and in
collaboration with those closest to the problem.
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